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Abstract
This article revisits a recent shift in standard form sovereign bond contracts to promote
collective action among creditors. Major press outlets welcomed the shift as a milestone in
fighting financial crises that threatened the global economy. Officials and academics said it
was a triumph of market forces. We turned to it for insights on contract change and crisis
management. Our research suggests that the incident might have broader implications. The
contracting parties and others involved in the shift apparently used private contract terms to
send public signals in ways that are rarely discussed in contracts literature. This article is
based on our work in the sovereign debt community, including over eighty interviews with
investors, lawyers, economists and government officials. Despite widespread public
enthusiasm for contract reform, in private, few participants described the substantive change
as an effective response to financial crises; many said it was simply unimportant. Most
explained their own participation in the shift as a mix of symbolic gesture and political
maneuver, designed to achieve goals apart from solving the technical problems for which the
new contract terms offered a fix.
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I.

Introduction

V.

Stewart Macaulay’s classic study of Wisconsin manufacturers found that contracts often played a
bit part in the business relationships they purported to govern.1 Businessmen deliberately
refrained from spelling out transaction particulars in writing, and failed to provide for some
entirely foreseeable contingencies. Even when deals went sour, few resorted to legal sanctions,
preferring instead to resolve disputes informally. Macaulay’s findings were stunning because
they did not comport with the prevailing model of business actors following detailed contracts
replete with legal consequences for every conceivable contingency. His study raised three kinds
of questions for contract scholarship going forward. First, how should courts interpret terms
deliberately left vague by the parties? Second, if contracts (or, for that matter, the law) did not
govern business relationships, what did? Third, why would anyone spend time and money on
contract terms that were, in the parties’ own words, beside the point?
Answers to the first two questions are the subject of a distinguished literature.2 The third
question has received relatively little attention until recently.3 While our project did not start out
1

Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Amer. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963).
See e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va L. Rev. 1089 (1981) for a
classic treatment of the first question. Macaulay’s own study focused on answering the second question. Although
it addresses statutes and ordinances more than contracts, Ellickson’s research on economic relations among cattle
ranchers offers critical insights into the second question. Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors
Settle Disputes (1991).
3
Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 L & Soc. Rev. 91 (2003), offers the broadeest theoretical
framework for answering the third question. The large and growing literature on the “boilerplate” phenomenon (see
infra n. __) addresses one aspect of the question – why parties fail to reform suboptimal terms. Few studies offer an
affirmative case for including contract terms that might be technically suboptimal. But see e.g., Claire A. Hill, A
Comment on Language and Norms in Complex Business Contracting, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 29 (2001) at 56,
suggesting that the signaling value of contract terms may be distinct from their mechanical function.
2

2

trying to answer the third question, our findings point in its direction. We studied sophisticated
market actors who deliberately changed their contracts, in an apparent attempt at contingency
planning. But most of them told us that they were not worried about the contingency the new
terms addressed, and insisted that these terms were at best marginally useful, most likely
unimportant, in managing risks associated with default. They said they adopted the terms in
their private contracts primarily to send a public message to non-parties – other governments,
international institutions, and the broader markets – in hope of getting political, reputational, and
economic benefits. And now, for the story of Collective Action Clauses.
In June 1997, a developing country defied convention. It issued New York law bonds that let
75% of the bondholders change key financial terms.4 Until then, standard form New York law
contracts required unanimous consent. But no one seemed to notice the innovation, and just
about no one followed suit.
In February 2003, another developing country issued New York law bonds with a 75%
amendment threshold.5 The world of international finance erupted in applause and criticism.6
Major press outlets, finance ministers and senior executives publicly pondered the shift.7 Other
countries adopted similar provisions under the rubric of “collective action clauses” or “CACs”.
Academic study of sovereign debt contracts took on new importance. This article is part of an
effort to understand what happened and what it means.
Standard – or “boilerplate” – terms in complex financial contracts rarely change.8 The basic
4

See Offering Circular for the Republic of Kazakhstan, $350 million, 8.375% Notes due 2002, Issued on October 1,
1997 (on file with authors)
5
See Pricing Supplement and Prospectus for the United Mexican States, $1 billion, February 2003 (on file with
authors) (also available at sec.gov).
6
See e.g., Statement of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/news/previous_news/ministerial_meetings_communiques/statement_of_g
-7_finance_ministers_and_central_bank_governors.html, Part III infra, and n. [272 – email] infra.
7
Id. An April 25, 2006 Westlaw search in the ALLNEWS database for all articles discussing “Collective Action
Clauses” in the sovereign debt context yielded over 400 hits, including numerous references to official statements.
8
See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal L. Rev. 261 (1985) and Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 Va. L. Rev. 713
(1997), for key early treatments of the subject. For analysis of bond contracts among sophisticated commercial
parties, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. Rev.
667; Choi & Gulati, supra n. __. For a recent survey of the issues in boilerplate contracting, see Symposium on
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theoretical explanation of boilerplate attributes it to learning and network effects, and associated
“switching costs”.9 Theory suggests that market participants attach value to contract terms solely
because they have been used in the past and are well-known (learning effects) or are widely used
now and/or are expected to be widely used in the future (network effects). As a result, firms
might adopt terms that are suboptimal on their own merits just because they are well understood
or widely used. Switching may be costly for a single firm because it takes time and effort to
produce a new term that works and to educate the target audience about its meaning. There is no
guarantee that investors, analysts and judges will interpret the term in a way that is favorable to
its original proponent or – as the example in our opening paragraphs illustrates – that others will
adopt the term in the foreseeable future.
Despite several prominent empirical studies of contract standardization, boilerplate change is still
poorly understood because it happens so rarely, slowly and quietly. Contract terms do not
normally feature on the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal, the Economist, or the
Financial Times, let alone in dozens of academic articles in law, economics and political
science.10 Against this background, the dramatic and public shift in sovereign bond
documentation beginning in 2003 offers a rare perspective on the contracting process and
boilerplate change.
The CAC episode is unusual in another respect. World leaders generally do not know what
boilerplate is, much less feature it in communiqués reserved for big-picture concerns like global
economic imbalances. Yet for nearly a decade CACs had a guaranteed spot in summit
Boilerplate Contracts, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 821 (2006); see also Omri Ben-Shahar, Foreword, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 821
(2006) (an overview of the symposium articles).
9
See Kahan & Klausner, supra note __, at __.
10
See e.g., John B. Taylor, Loan Rangers, The Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2006, Sovereign Bonds, The Financial
Times, May 11, 1999, and The Economist, February 13, 1999 at 21, March 27, 1999, at 22, 71, and April 24, 1999,
at 72 and n. __ infra. The legal academy has hosted three symposia in as many years (in the Emory Law Journal, the
Chicago Journal of International Law and the Georgetown Journal of International Law) featuring extensive
discussions of CACs. A basic search of the academic databases in economics, political science and law reveals a
large body of CAC research. See, e.g., Jose Wynne & Federico Weinschelbaum, Renegotiation, Collective Action
Clauses and Sovereign Debt Markets, 67 J. Int’l Econ. 47 (2005); Barry Eichengreen, Kenneth Kletzer & Ashoka
Mody, Crisis Resolution: Next Steps, Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 03-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco (2003); Kenneth M. Kletzer, Sovereign Bond Restructuring, Collective Action Clauses, and Official Crisis
Intervention, IMF Working Paper, No. 03/134 (2003); Andrew G Haldane, Adrian Penalver, Victoria Saporta &
Hyun Song Shin, Optimal Collective Action Clause Thresholds, Bank of England Working Papers 249 (2004) (at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2004/60/pdf/haldan.pdf); Sayantan Ghosal & Marcus Miller, Coordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures, 113 Econ. Journal 276 (2004).
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statements alongside financial stability and currency regimes.11 Moreover, boilerplate theory
does not usually contemplate a role for the public sector in promoting a switch to optimal private
contract terms.12 But in the case of collective action clauses, governments not party to the
contracts got credit for playing a central role in the shift.13 Judging from recent policy initiatives,
the apparent success of the CAC campaign may have created a new model where economic
policy proposals are framed in terms of private contract reform. The latest public-sector effort to
promote GDP-indexed bonds cites the CAC experience as an inspiration and even adopts some
of the organizational features of the earlier initiative, such as the expert contract drafting group.14
For all its value as precedent, the public sector’s role in the CAC episode remains unexplored.
Proponents in the Bush Administration called the shift “market-based” even as market
commentary attributed it to government pressure. On the other hand, neither the United States
nor any other G-7 government appears to have issued direct threats or bribes, the traditional
instruments of “hard power” used to pressure developing countries.15 Financial industry
regulators refused to mandate CACs or otherwise promote their inclusion, despite pressure from
prominent economists and some officials.16 It may be that the “soft power” 17 of G-7 ideas
11

E.g., U.S. Actions at the G-8 Summit, White House Press Release, June 2, 2003 (available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030602-10.html); G-7 Finance Ministers Adopt Financial
Crises Action Plan, Department of Finance (Canada) Release, April 20, 2002 (available at
http://www.fin.gc.ca/news02/02-034e.html); G-20 Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank Governors’ Meeting: Delhi
Communique, November 23, 2002 (available at http://www.g20.org/Public/Communiques/Pdf/2002_india.pdf).
12
It does not preclude it either. In their original study, Kahan and Klausner advocate private standard-setting bodies
for contracts on the model of the existing standard-setting bodies for industrial products; some of the product
standard-setters are state-run. See Kahan & Klausner, supra n. __ at 761-764. See also Robert B. Ahdieh, The Role
of Groups in Norm Transformation: A Dramatic Sketch in Three Parts, 6 Chi. J. Int’l L. 231 (2005) (arguing that
groups, including groups of government officials, played a key role in inducing the shift to CACs). Our focus is on
the government’s role in promoting a substantively optimal contract term, as distinct from contract standardization
or procedural improvements. Examples of the latter include the role of the U.S. Federal Reserve in promoting
standardization in derivatives contracts coordinated by private industry bodies, or the role of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York and the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority in improving the documentation and clearing
practices for credit derivatives. See e.g., Gillian Tett, Bankers Get Lucky with Clean-Up of Credit Derivatives
Trades, The Financial Times, July 28, 2006, at 22.
13
See Section III(i)-(iii) infra..
14
G-24 Seminar on GDP-Indexed Bonds, Friday, April 21, 2006, webcast available at
http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.asp?eventid=577.
15
One way of exerting economic power is through loan conditionality of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
trade or other agreement links. Uruguay is a possible exception. See e.g., n. [318] infra.
16
See e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Restructuring Sovereign Debt, 17 J. Econ. Persp. 75 (2003).
17
Political scientist Joseph Nye first used the term in the 1980s to describe “the ability to get what you want by
attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals. It differs from hard power, the ability to use the carrots and
sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will.” Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Propaganda Isn’t the
Way: Soft Power, International Herald Tribune, January 10, 2003. See generally, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power:
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convinced developing countries of the CACs’ inherent virtues. But no emerging markets official
was willing to tell us that they participated in the CAC shift because the clauses could alter the
course of a crisis. Moral suasion – the regulatory cousin of soft power – is a plausible
explanation for the shift.18 Scholars have pointed out that in the sovereign debt context, suasion
can include a wide range of approaches from implicit coercion to purely informational “cueing”
to help overcome network effects.19 Which – if any – of these suasion tactics worked and why?
A final lingering puzzle of the CAC episode is just how few private or public sector participants
in it express strong feelings about the clauses as such. We spoke with dozens of actors whose
websites and speeches proclaim the seminal importance of the CAC shift (usually as they claim
paternity), yet in the interviews, a scant few described the change itself as important in
addressing the problem of sovereign debt restructuring or financial crises in the emerging
markets. Many were unsure of how the new clauses would work in crisis; most said they were
probably good, none said they were clearly bad. More participants volunteered strong feelings
about the process that led to the shift – praising cooperation, grumbling about wasted time and
official meddling. Was this another instance of wasted lawyering, or transnational process for its
own sake? 20
If true in part, this description is incomplete and not entirely fair. Most participants suggested
that their effort on CACs had less to do with the clauses’ literal purpose (facilitating future
contract modification) than with their relative utility in advancing other goals, such as signaling
commitment to a new crisis management strategy, currying political favor, or establishing
reputations in the market. Some were successful in achieving these goals; others failed. Their
The Means to Success in World Politics (2004).
18
The classic example of moral suasion is the regulatory approach of the Bank of England (BOE) before the United
Kingdom established a unified financial regulator in 2001. The approach developed largely “outside the law” based
on deep historical relationships between the central bank and the financial institutions it regulated. See e.g., Heidi
Mandanis Schoone & Michael Taylor, Convergence and Competition: The Case of Bank Regulation in Britain and
the United States, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 595 (1999). Its effectiveness was attributable partly to the trust between the
regulator and the regulated institutions, including but by no means limited to the Bank of England’s (“BOE”)
capacity to credibly threaten enforcement “with a raised eyebrow”. Financial Regulation: Industry Changes Prompt
Need to Reconsider U.S. Regulatory Structure. GAO Report October 2004 at http://www.gao.gov/htext/d0561.html.
19
Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the International Order,
53 Emory L.J. 691, 694 (2004) (“cueing” may include a signal that the term will be widely used).
20
Macaulay, supra n. __ (parties ignoring contracts); Annelise Riles, The Network Inside Out (2000) at 171-178
(women’s issues “networkers” working for the sake of the Network and its paraphernalia, with the effect of shutting
out politics and the women in whose name the networking takes place).
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collaboration produced a revealing study in the uses of contract form and ways of governance.
We depart from earlier quantitative and analytical studies of sovereign debt contracts21 in favor
of an interview-based approach.22 We have collected over eighty accounts of the CAC shift from
market participants, officials and others who took part in it, and have supplemented these with
our own observations from the daily work of law firms and government offices, conferences and
negotiations, press accounts, official documents, and – of course – the debt contracts themselves.
We tried to be comprehensive in two ways: first, by reaching out to everyone involved in the
CAC shift (about 150-200 people by our estimate) and second, by soliciting different perspective
on the same events – for example, interviewing issuers, underwriters, investors and the lawyers
on both sides in the early CAC deals. Based on the interviews and our own experience with this
community since the early 1990s, we believe that we contacted over half of all direct participants
in the shift. We obtained multiple accounts of virtually every incident we describe. But we
deliberately eschewed statistical survey tactics in favor of free-form interviews that allowed our
contacts to frame their accounts in their own terms23 and produced the nuance that we found
21

See e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of
Sovereign Bonds, 53 Emory L.J. 929 (2004) and infra n. __.
22
Interviews serve many purposes in social science; their format varies accordingly. For example, in statistical
surveys designed to assess social trends, standardized questionnaires are put to a representative sample of the
population. Interviews are structured to produce quantifiable results. See e.g., Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social
Research, (5th ed. 1989) for an accessible textbook treatment of survey methodology, including questionnaire design
at 139-160 and sampling at 163-207. Historians use less structured interviews to elicit accounts of past events from
contemporaries; the goal is to gather reliable evidence of such events. Oral history often supplements documentary
evidence. See Trevor Lummis, Listening to History: The Authenticity of Oral Evidence (1987) at 39-40 and 42
(contrasting survey and oral history methods). David K. Dunaway & Willa K. Baum, eds., Oral History: An
Interdisciplinary Anthology (1984) is an influential collection of perspectives on oral history methods. In
ethnography, interviews are part of “participant observation” designed to discover cultural norms and practices.
Traditional classics include Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922), E.E. Evans-Pritchard,
The Nuer (1940), and, in the American legal context, Karl N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne
Way (1941, 1953). Law scholars have increasingly used the full range of interview approaches. See e.g.,, Kenneth
M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 Miami L. Rev.
285 (1987), Howell E. Jackson & Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets: Evidence
from Europe in 1999--Part I, 56 Bus. Law. 653 (2001), G. Mitu Gulati & William A. Klein, Economic Organization
in the Construction Industry: A Case Study of Collaborative Production under High Uncertainty, 1 Berkeley Bus.
L.J. 137 (2004), Bruce M. Price, A Butterfly Flaps its Wings in Menlo Park: An Organizational Analysis of
Increases in Associate Salaries, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 713, Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An
Empirical Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1195 (2005)
and John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the
Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. Corp. L. 1 (2005) (describing “business ethnography” at 9-12).
Our approach favors Conley and Williams, and the use of interviews by Dezalay and Garth (which they describe as
“reflexive sociology”). Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers,
Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin American States (2002) (hereinafter “Palace Wars”).
23
Cf. Etienne, supra n. __ at 16 and Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial
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lacking in prior studies, including our own.
Below we first review the sovereign debt context, the contract provisions at the center of the
study, and the process that led to the shift in 2003. Second, we recount alternative explanations
for the shift that have been published to date. We then describe the findings from our interviews
and conclude with implications for contract change, the uses of contract, and governance.
II.

The Setting

i.

Emerging Markets Sovereign Debt: Actors and Contracts

The history of government borrowing goes back to ancient times, as does the history of
government debt default.24 Our focus is on the external debt of emerging markets governments,
which traditionally has meant money borrowed from foreign residents in foreign currency under
foreign law – for example, Mexico’s dollar-denominated, New York-law bonds marketed to U.S.
residents.25
Tradable bonds first became the instrument of choice for sovereign borrowers in the 19th century.
Bondholders in London, and later Paris and Berlin financed commodity-exporting economies on
the periphery, with default spikes every decade or so. U.S. bondholders joined the party early in
the 20th century, mainly sending money to Latin America. With the Great Depression came a

Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order 17 (1996) (hereinafter, “Arbitration”) on the value
of encouraging interviewees to present their own picture of the relevant legal field: “it serves to identify what they
seek to appear to be and what they reject, thereby serving to define the principles of opposition that structure the
field and shape change over time”.
24
See e.g., Nancy Birdsall & John Williamson, Delivering on Debt Relief 14 (2002) for a short overview of
sovereign lending and default going back to Greek city-states’ defaults to the Delos Temple.
25
The distinction is important because since the period we study, governments have begun to shift away from such
borrowing into local currency, often local law debt. Structural Changes in Emerging Sovereign Debt and
Implications for Financial Stability, in International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Market
Developments and Issues, Chapter III, April 2006 (hereinafter, “Structural Changes”). As countries remove
restrictions on capital flows, the link among currency, governing law and residence of the holder has weakened.
While economists usually focus on currency and residence of the holder, for purposes of this project, we are only
concerned with governing law. See Anna Gelpern & Brad Setser, Domestic Debt and the Doomed Quest for Equal
Treatment, 35 Geo. J. Int’l L. 795, 795-96 (2004) for a discussion of the different and evolving definitions of
domestic and external debt used by lawyers and economists.
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massive wave of defaults that halted sovereign bond issuance for decades.26 In the 1970s,
developing countries took out loans from commercial banks in New York and London, financed
with deposits from oil-exporting nations. A series of loan defaults ushered in the 1980s debt
crisis, which stunted growth for a decade in parts of the developing world, and threatened the
health of major international banks. The crisis ended – at least in theory – when banks agreed to
exchange their loans for Brady Bonds, named after the U.S. Treasury Secretary who helped
broker the solution. Trading in the Brady Bonds paved the way for new issues. Today’s
emerging markets debt market was born.
The Economist defines emerging markets as developing countries, explained in turn as a
euphemism for poor countries.27 The term is also used occasionally to describe all countries with
annual per capita income below $10,725, classified as low- and middle-income by the World
Bank.28 This excludes high-income or “mature markets” issuers such as the United States and
the other G-7 economies with well-established domestic financial systems, steady access to
domestic and international investors, and the capacity issue debt in their own currency.29 We
prefer a narrower definition, which reflects the fact that only a minority of all poor and middleincome countries have market access on any meaningful scale. JP Morgan’s Emerging Markets
Bond Index Global (EMBI Global) includes U.S. dollar-denominated debt instruments of
governments and state-owned entities in 33 countries, for which dealers quote prices daily.30

26

For different perspectives on this history, see e.g., Albert Fishlow, The Debt Crisis in Historical Perspective, in
Miles Kahler, ed., The Politics of International Debt (1986) at 37, Barry Eichengreen & Michael Bordo, Crises Now
and Then: What Lessons from the Last Era of Financial Globalization?, November 2001, available at
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~eichengr/research/goodhartfestschriftjan9.pdf, and Vinod K. Aggarwal, Debt
Games: Strategic Interaction in International Debt Rescheduling (1996). At the end of the 19th century, British
bondholders had about a third of their overseas portfolio in foreign government debt. Eichengreen & Bordo, supra,
at 10. For analysis of the recurring crisis and serial default phenomena see, respectively, Charles P. Kindleberger &
Robert Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (2005) and Carmen M. Reinhart,
Kenneth S. Rogoff & Miguel A. Savastano, Debt Intolerance, 2003 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1.
27
“Emerging Markets” in Economics A-Z. Economist.com, available at
http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?LETTER=E; see also Ashoka Mody, What is an
Emerging Market, 35 Geo. J. Int’l L.641 (2004).
28
The World Bank, Country Classification, available at www.worldbank.org/datastatistics: “Economies are divided
according to 2005 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income,
$875 or less; lower middle income, $876 - $3,465; upper middle income, $3,466 - $10,725; and high income,
$10,726 or more.”
29
Id. and Structural Changes, supra n. __.
30
Gloria M. Kim, EMBI Global and EMBI Global Diversified: Rules and Methodology, J.P. Morgan Securities
Inc., December 2004. As of July 14, 2006, the countries represented in EMBI Global were Argentina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Hungary,
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Market participants frequently use this index as a proxy to describe emerging markets external
debt as an asset class. In April 2006, EMBIG market capitalization was $292 billion. Mexico,
Brazil, Russia and Turkey comprise over half this total (Argentina was a big presence until its
$100 billion default in 2001); a dozen countries account for nearly 90%. Over 40% of the debt
in the index is investment grade.31 Total external debt outstanding issued by EMBIG countries,
including instruments denominated in Euro and others not included in the index is probably close
to $400 billion.32 For comparison, foreign-currency debt issued by mature markets governments
(such as New Zealand’s Yen-denominated securities) is at about double the emerging markets
total. However, mature markets governments are often able to sell local-currency debt to foreign
investors: at the end of April 2006, foreign residents held just over $2 trillion in dollardenominated U.S. Treasury securities.33 Emerging markets debt is actively traded: EMTA, a
traders’ association, reported trading volume at $4.7 trillion in 2004.34
The number of people involved in emerging markets sovereign debt is small, partly due to the
small number of large-volume issuers. Compared to 33 countries in the EMBIG, over 2,500
companies are listed on the New York Stock Exchange alone.35 Raising money abroad is most
often the responsibility of a country’s finance ministry, occasionally of the central bank; standalone debt management offices have gained popularity recently. The core government team for a
new issue is usually about half a dozen people.
When an emerging markets government wants to issue debt abroad, it normally hires an
international investment bank to “manage” the offering – design and market the instruments,
and, for underwritten deals, commit to buy the debt. These so-called “sell-side” institutions
Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Russia, Serbia, South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam. The older EMBI+ index
includes 18 countries, has higher liquidity requirements than EMBI Global and excludes the debt of parastatals and
local governments. Gloria M. Kim, Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+): Rules and Methodology, J.P.
Morgan Securities Inc., December 2004.
31
Gloria M. Kim, EMBI Global Regional and Country Composition and Statistics, JP Morgan, July 14, 2006,
available at www.morganmarkets.com.
32
Jennie Byun & William Oswald, Emerging Markets External Debt as an Asset Class, JP Morgan, April 26, 2006,
available at www.morganmarkets.com.
33
U.S. Department of the Treasury and Federal Reserve Board, Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, June
15, 2006 available at http://www.treas.gov/tic/mfh.txt.
34
EM Background: History and Development, EMTA, available at http://www.emta.org/emarkets/, last visited on
July 16, 2006.
35
www.nyse.com
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compete for mandates from governments; often two or more institutions are appointed “co-lead
managers” for an issue. Sell-side bankers refer to the issuing governments as their clients; their
fees are a portion of the issue proceeds. About half a dozen investment banks dominate the
scene, with another handful managing an occasional issue for a marginal sovereign. Sell-side
banks have research departments that report regularly on the emerging markets. In theory,
research and investment banking are separated by “Chinese walls”.36 When sell-side research
analysts speak of clients, they refer to the investors, also known as the “buy-side”.
There is no authoritative source of information on investors in emerging markets sovereign debt.
Sell-side research departments occasionally survey their clients and governments occasionally
try to get a fix on their creditor base; neither effort produces a comprehensive picture.37 Less
concentrated than the sell-side, the buy-side universe in the sovereign world is still small – a few
dozen funds hold most of the external debt for most emerging markets governments, except
where domestic, expatriate or retail investors are a significant presence. The funds are a mix of
“dedicated” and “crossover” institutions, active trading accounts and “buy and hold” investors.
Dedicated investors commit to put all or some of their money in risky emerging markets assets,
as in, for example, a Latin America or Southeast Asia Fund.38 Crossover investors are generally
more risk-averse, often regulated entities such as pension funds and insurance companies that
may invest a portion of their portfolio in the emerging markets to boost returns in good times,
when yields are low on mature markets assets.39 Riskier debt attracts active traders that look for
a quick profit in arbitraging price and interest rate differences worldwide.40 Hedge funds are
36

For a skeptical account of the separation between research and investment banking in emerging markets finance,
see Paul Blustein, And the Money Kept Rolling In (And Out): Wall Street, the IMF, and the Bankrupting of
Argentina 61-71 (2005).
37
See Structural Changes, supra n. __ at 95, and Byun & Oswald, supra n. __ at 34-35.
38
The IMF estimated that 30-40% of the funds invested in the emerging markets in 2001 came from dedicated
investors. See International Monetary Fund, Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises
Restructuring International Sovereign Bonds (January 11, 2001), at 16, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/series/03/ips.pdf. Such investors usually measure their performance relative to
an index such as EMBI+ or EMBIG. International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Market
Developments and Issues (December 2002), at 36, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2002/04/pdf/chp3.pdf. See Blustein, And the Money, supra n. __ at 70-73
on the paradoxes of index investing.
39
Until recently returns on emerging and mature markets assets rarely correlated. See Structural Changes, supra n.
__.
40
Active traders and speculative investors can be especially important in the run-up to or after the default. They buy
distressed debt at a deep discount, and often agree to harsh restructuring terms because they may still reap large
profits relative to the low purchase price. Commentators have often conflated distressed debt buyers and holdout
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often associated with such investment strategies, but proprietary trading desks at large
institutions can behave similarly. Some buy-side outfits have their own research departments.
Domestic residents and institutions in the issuing countries are an increasingly important investor
category in some cases, as are retail investors (real people investing directly), especially for
governments raising money in Europe and Japan.41 .
Six trade associations cater to the investor community. Three of these focus on the emerging
markets; the rest deal overwhelmingly with mature markets securities.42 All but one trade group
claim to represent both the buy-side and the sell-side; one was established specifically to
represent the buy-side.
Lawyers in this practice mirror the market’s concentration.43 Half a dozen U.S. law firms, all but
one headquartered in New York, document nearly all New York-law sovereign issues. A
handful of London-based firms dominate the English-law sovereign market. Few of these firms
have more than one or two partners specializing in sovereign debt.44 The senior lawyers in this
cohort tend to be veterans of the 1980s loan crisis; the younger ones spent their early days
documenting new bond issues in the 1990s.
Sovereign bond documentation usually consists of a disclosure statement distributed to investors
(and, in the case of a registered public offering, filed with securities regulators), a distribution
agreement between the issuer and the managers, and a series of agreements, including the debt
instrument itself – a promise to pay – that governs the relationship between the sovereign debtor
litigants, even though the two business models are quite different. See Anna Gelpern, After Argentina, Institute for
International Economics Policy Brief PB05-02, available at www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb05-2.pdf (September
2005), at 7.
41
Id. For example, German and Italian retail investors held a significant portion of Argentina’s debt at the time of
its default in 2001. In the United States, suitability rules and other constraints under federal securities laws have
generally precluded the development of an active retail market.
42
These are the Emerging Markets Creditors Association (EMCA, www.emcreditors.com), EMTA (www.emta.org),
The Institute of International Finance (IIF, www.iif.com), the Securities Industry Association (SIA, www.sia.com),
the Bond Market Association (BMA, www.bondmarkets.com), and the International Capital Market Association
(ICMA, www.icma-group.org, a product of the merger between the International Primary Market Association
(IPMA) and the International Securities Market Association (ISMA)). SIA and BMA have recently announced their
intention to merge.
43
Compare Dezalay and Garth’s description of the small and tightly linked international arbitration community,
Dezalay & Garth, Arbitration, supra n. __ at 10.
44
Cleary Gottlieb is an exception. See Choi and Gulati, supra n. __.
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and its bondholders. Innovations such as shelf registration and medium-term note programs
enable governments to establish a document umbrella that applies to a large portion of their
issues and thereby to streamline documentation for any single borrowing. The key contracts are
a product of issuer-manager negotiations, with their respective lawyers. Buy-side investors
generally do not see the disclosure statement45 until the marketing phase, with little room for
detailed negotiation. As a result, it is up to the managers and their lawyers to negotiate a
document package they can sell. Structuring, negotiating, and selling a sovereign issue can take
anywhere from a few days to several months; complex restructurings take even longer.
Unlike other financial contracts, the sovereign lot has had trouble establishing its free market
credentials. When one of the parties is a government, power politics inevitably sway the
invisible hand. Governments enjoy special immunities, and so might choose to walk away from
foreign debts when it suits their domestic political purposes.46 They have few credible ways to
commit to pay or to follow contractual default procedures, and no sovereign bankruptcy regime
to fill the gap. The resulting debt contracts are inevitably incomplete.47 A sovereign debt crisis
is often a political crisis with strategic implications beyond financial stability. From this angle, it
is unsurprising that governments occasionally take interest in one another’s debt contracts.48
Before the trend towards restricting sovereign immunities took hold in the second half of the 20th
century,49 foreign ministries were often the only channel for bondholders seeking redress.50 But
rich country governments did not always side with their nationals – bondholder concerns have
had to compete with other parts of the foreign policy agenda. The U.S. Government was
45

Not one investor reported reading the underlying contracts.
On the economics and politics of sovereign debt and specifically, the question of why sovereigns repay their
debts, see Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,
48 Rev. Econ. Stud. 289, 289-90 (1981) (discussing the reputational model); Harold L. Cole et al., Default,
Settlement, and Signaling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt, 36 Int'l Econ. Rev. 365
(1995) (similar); Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget? 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 43,
46-47 (1989) (discussing the enforcement model).
47
See Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, Sovereign Debt Structuring and Restructuring: An Incomplete Contracts
Approach (2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
48
See Miles Kahler, Explaining the Debt Crisis, in Kahler, ed., supra n. __, at 16-22; for a more recent overview of
official actors involved in sovereign debt restructuring, see Lex Reiffel, Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Case for
Ad Hoc Machinery 24-45 (2003) at 24-45; for a lawyer’s perspective, see Lee C. Buchheit, The Role of the Official
Sector in Sovereign Debt Workouts, 6 Chi. J. Int’l L. 333 (2005).
49
See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992); Georges R. Delaume, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act and Public Debt Litigation: Some Fifteen Years Later, 88 Am. J. Int’l L. 257 (1994).
50
See e.g., Rory Macmillan, Toward a Sovereign Debt Work-out System, 16 Nw. J. Int’ L. & Bus. 57, 80-84 (1995).
46
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implicated in managing the 1980s Latin American debt crisis both because of the region’s
strategic significance and because sovereign defaults threatened the health of major U.S. banks.51
The next generation of crises started with Mexico’s near-default in 1994, averted with the help of
a $50 billion U.S.-led rescue package.52 It culminated with Argentina’s massive bond default in
2001, where foreign policy concerns were no less salient even in the absence of bilateral
financing.53
The wave of calamity that started with Mexico’s 1994 “Tequila Crisis” turned public attention to
sovereign bond contracts.54 It also spawned countless academic and policy projects to identify
and reassess contract terms that could impact crisis management.55 Amendment procedures
quickly emerged as central among these.
ii.

Meet the Clauses

Contract terms are rarely named for social science theories. Collective Action Clauses are the
exception. Collective action problems in economics and political science describe the
circumstances where individuals acting rationally to maximize self-interest generate an outcome
detrimental to their interests as a group.56 Free-riding and prisoner’s dilemma are variants of the
problem. Collective action clauses in sovereign debt contracts describe provisions that address
collective action problems that might arise among creditors, such as the incentives to rush for the
exits (sell the debt), rush to the courthouse, or hold out and free ride on a restructuring

51

See e.g., Ross P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Debt Trading from 1989 to
1993, 21 Fordham Int’l.L.J. 1802, at 1802-1815.
52
Moises Naim & Sebastian Edwards, eds., Mexico 1994: Anatomy of an Emerging Market Crash (1998)
53
Eric Helleiner, The Strange Story of Bush and the Argentine Debt Crisis, 26 Third World Q. 951, 965 (2005).
54
While many of the crises did not involve foreign sovereign bonds, these were seen as a key source of
vulnerability. See Edwin M. Truman, Debt Restructuring: Evolution or Revolution? 1 Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, 341-346 (2002), and Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, Bail Ins and Bail Outs, Chapter 8 (2004).
55
See e.g., Tobjorn Becker et al., Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?, at
http:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp0192.pdf (2001); Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Would
Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? (NBER Working Paper No. 7458) (2000); Liz Dixon & David
Wall, Collective Action Problems and Collective Action Clauses, Fin. Stability Rev., June 2000; Anthony Richards
& Mark Gugiatti, Do Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New Evidence from Emerging Markets, 6
Int’l Fin. 415 (2003); Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, The Use of Collective Action Clauses in New York Law
Bonds of Sovereign Issuers, 35 Geo. J. Int’l L. 815 (2004).
56
Mancur Olson generalized the analysis of collective action problems in “The Logic of Collective Action: Public
Goods and the Theory of Groups” (1971).
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agreement.57 Creditor coordination failures delay debt restructuring, ultimately reducing
recovery for creditors as a group. All other things being equal, large groups lacking social
cohesion are more prone to collective action problems. Hence the move from regulated bank
syndicates to more dispersed bondholder constituencies was expected to cause disruption in
sovereign debt management.58
Domestic bankruptcy regimes address creditor collective action problems for corporate,
individual and municipal debtors. No bankruptcy law applies to sovereign debtors. By the mid1990s, a chorus of lawyers, officials and academic economists anticipated a sovereign bond
crisis and predicted chaos. Both academics and economists in the “official sector” (here the IMF
and its dominant shareholders) framed the policy challenge in collective action terms.59 The
presumption that any attempt at bond restructuring would lead to systemic disruption was so
strong in 1994 that few were willing to risk amending its domestic-law dollar-indexed tesobonos
– the instruments at the center of Mexico’s crisis – even if technically it could have been done by
fiat.60 Mexico’s ties to the United States and other factors instead weighed in favor of a rescue
loan.
Working groups of officials from systemically important economies assembled in the aftermath
of crises in Mexico and throughout Asia considered and rejected sovereign bankruptcy as a
political non-starter. Their reports released in 1996 and 1998 advocated widespread adoption of
contract terms – some old, some new – to improve creditor coordination and bind potentially
disruptive minorities.61 In practice, these recommendations targeted New York Law bonds,
57

See Eichengreen, supra note __, at __ (Journal of Econ Perspectives article); Thomas Jackson, The Logic and
Limits of Bankruptcy Law 11-14 (1986).
58
This description has always been somewhat stylized – some syndicates included dozens, even hundreds of banks,
while some bond issues are closely held.
59
See e.g., GROUP OF TEN, THE RESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN LIQUIDITY CRISES: A REPORT TO THE MINISTERS AND
GOVERNORS PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE DEPUTIES (1996) (hereinafter the “Rey Report”), available at
http://www.bis.org/ publ/gten03.pdf and Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, Crisis? What Crisis? Orderly
Workouts for Sovereign Debtors (1995), a volume commissioned by the Bank of England as part of its work on the
Rey Report.
60
An op-ed in The Financial Times reflected widely felt sentiment: “As the Mexican crisis showed, the world
financial system desperately needs a mechanism to draw bondholders together to renegotiate foreign government
debt.” Rory Macmillan, Personal View: New Lease of Life for Bondholder Councils, The Financial Times, August
15, 1995, at 11. In fact, the Mexican crisis showed little, since the rescue package preempted bondholder mischief
by paying them off. See n. 176, infra, and accompanying text.
61
See Rey Report, supra n. __, and Report of the Working Group on International Financial Crises (October 1998)
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which dominated the sovereign debt market and had few of the recommended terms, even if they
played no role either in Mexico or in Asia.62 Issuers and investors publicly dismissed the
prospect of coordination failures and rejected what they claimed was official intrusion in their
contracts.63 Despite a handful of prominent supporters in the market,64 contract reform initiative
stayed with the academy and the official sector. By 1998, the term “Collective Action Clauses”
or “CACs” came to describe the universe of terms they advocated; the name had stuck.65
Lawyers may seem like bit players in this story so far. But neither the officials nor the
economists who advocated CACs had intuited the content of the clauses on their own. Trade
journals and manuscripts circulating among practitioners by the mid-1990s identified four kinds
of terms. Most prominent were modification provisions that would allow a qualified majority of
creditors (usually 75% in principal amount) to change payment terms over minority objections.
These had been common in English and Japanese law bonds, but were virtually unheard of in
New York and German law bonds. Second, a related set of terms would restrict an individual
creditor’s capacity to demand full repayment (accelerate) or sue the debtor. Clauses that require
creditors to share litigation proceeds with their comrades had been used in syndicated loans and
were being proposed for bonds, to dampen incentives to sue. Third, collective representation or
engagement clauses would organize bondholders and channel their activities through a trustee or
a creditor committee. Deputizing the trustee to accelerate, sue and share the proceeds combines
the representative function with the brake on individual enforcement described earlier. Finally,
initiation clauses would help the debtor initiate a restructuring, and might sanction a payment
suspension and a “cooling off” period.
Recent market practice brought two other provisions into the limelight, both involving

(hereinafter the “G-22 Report”), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/othp01d.pdf.
62
New York law bonds accounted for about seventy percent of all emerging markets paper in 2002. See
International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Market Developments and Issues (December 13,
2002) at 44, available athttp://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2002/04/pdf/chp3.pdf, and The Design and
Effectiveness of Collective Action Clauses (June 2002), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/psi/2002/eng/060602.htm.
63
See infra n. [170] and accompanying text.
64
See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit, The Collective Representation Clause, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. September 1998; Ed
Bartholomew, Ernest Stern & Angela Liuzzi, Two-Step Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Market-Based Approach
in a World Without International Bankruptcy Law, 35 Geo. J. Int’l L. __ (2004).
65
The term “collective action clauses” appears to have been used for the first time in the G-22 Report.
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amendment. Traditionally, terms other than key financial terms could be amended with a simple
majority vote. This made it easier for countries exchanging distressed bonds for new ones to
solicit “exit consents” from participating creditors to disfigure the old bonds by stripping away
jurisdiction, immunity and other important provisions. Ecuador was the first among sovereigns
to use the tactic, which proved controversial with investors. The second new term was a twist on
modification, introduced in Uruguay’s 2003 debt restructuring, which allowed the issuer to
amend multiple bond issues together, with the consent of a higher fraction of all holders (for
example, 85% in outstanding principal across all issues) plus a lower fraction of each individual
issue (for example, 65%).66
Other contract terms, such as negative pledge, pari passu, cross-default, jurisdiction and waiver
of immunity, have drawn attention in crisis and are critical to the restructuring outcome;
however, these generally lie outside the CAC rubric.67
By all accounts, Mexico’s SEC-registered 12-year global note issue launched in February 2003
tipped the markets in the direction of CACs. Mexico’s sole – momentous – innovation was in
the modification provisions. Departing from the unanimity convention under New York law, the
notes allowed amendment of financial terms by holders of 75% of outstanding principal. In a
concession to creditors, Mexico raised the threshold for amending most other terms from 50% to
66 2/3%; several non-financial terms including status and waiver of immunity now required
75%.68
Trade association data from March 2006 suggest that since Mexico, at least 24 other countries –
including Brazil, South Korea, Turkey, and South Africa – have issued bonds with majority
modification provisions under New York law contracts, most using the 75% threshold for

66

See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 59
(2000), Lee C. Buchheit and Jeremiah S. Pam, Uruguay’s Innovations, 19 J. of Int’l Banking L. & Reg 28 (2004)
and Yan Liu, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bonds (August 2002) (available at
http://imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/liu.pdf).
67
See Anna Gelpern, For Richer, For Poorer: Sovereign Debt Contracts in Crisis, 1 J. Int’l Banking Reg. 20 (2000)
for an overview of clauses that had attracted official attention in the mid-1990s.
68
For one of the many official sector announcements of the Mexico 2003 shift, see
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2003/pn0353.htm.
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financial and key non-financial terms (“reserve matters”).69 Of the 25 total, six countries used a
trustee for one or more issues. Uruguay, Argentina and the Dominican Republic were the only
ones to allow aggregated majority voting across instruments; all three did so in the context of a
comprehensive distressed debt exchange that swept in most of their outstanding debt stock. Two
countries not included in the set of 25 because they used English law contracts adopted
engagement clauses to spell out procedures for appointing bondholder representatives, and
promised to pay their bill; however, the market has not followed their example to date.
When we speak of the “CAC shift”, we refer principally to the shift from unanimous to majority
modification provisions in New York law bonds, which is virtually complete for new issues. As
of February 2006, the stock of bonds with CACs was at 60% of the total outstanding – up from
40% in just three years.70.
As noted at the start of this article, CACs were introduced twice over the past decade. Mexico’s
2003 issue was hailed as the market mover by the official sector, and has attracted virtually all
the commentary. But six years earlier, a group of less prominent issuers including Bulgaria,
Kazakhstan, Egypt, Lebanon and Qatar used majority modification clauses in their New York
law bond issues aimed at the European market and exempt from SEC registration. These had
little market impact, and attracted no official or academic attention until after Mexico in 2003.
Although we focus on the shift that began in 2003, we discuss the earlier episode because the
contrast is illuminating.
III.

Official Stories and Published Explanations

The Mexico-led shift inspired a host of press releases, public statements, articles in the popular
and trade press, and renewed academic activity on the subject of CACs. Most authors tried to
explain why Mexico and those that followed it changed their contract forms. We found nine

69

EMTA, Sovereign Bond Documentation Charts, available at www.emta.org. Several countries started with 85%
and switched to 75% in subsequent issues.
70
International Monetary Fund, Report of the Managing Director to the International Monetary and Financial
Committee on the IMF’s Policy Agenda, April 20, 2006, at 8, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/042006.pdf. The total includes all international bonds, not just ones
governed by New York law. Most of the outstanding bonds without CACs were issued before 2003.
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categories of explanations, each emphasizing a different causal factor. In addition, we include an
account of the “lost issues” six years before Mexico. These public accounts served as
background for our own interviews.
i. Fear of SDRM. In this account, CACs prevail because they are the lesser of two evils. The
IMF had proposed the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) as a statutory regime
to deal with creditor coordination problems. Borrowers and private creditors publicly rejected
SDRM as an IMF power grab designed to encourage defaults and reduce demand for official
money.71 Before SDRM, neither sovereigns nor their creditors had shown any enthusiasm for
CACs.72 With SDRM on the horizon, CACs began to look attractive.73 Mexico and others then
adopted CACs for fear that SDRM would prevail without an alternative method of dealing with
sovereign insolvency.74 The nuanced version of this story had Mexico adopting CACs to stop
the talk of SDRM, which was harming the asset class regardless of the initiative’s ultimate
prospects.75
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Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 Geo. J. Int’l L. 299 (2005), is the
authoritative account of the initiative. The Economist explained the CAC shift this way in May 2003:
Why have borrowers changed their minds? One reason is fear. Once the SDRM was mooted – a far worse
idea than collective action clauses in borrowers’ eyes – the thought that it might be put into effect focused
minds on the search for a market based alternative.
Dealing With Default, The Economist, May 8, 2003.
Paul Blustein’s book on Argentina’s crisis concludes:
The triumph of CACs over the SDRM offered some depressing insights into the difficulty of making
headway on international financial reforms. The idea of introducing the clauses had been proposed years
earlier and had stalled amid opposition from Wall Street; only when the more radical SDRM reared its head
did private financiers come around to backing CACs as the lesser evil.
Paul Blustein, And the Money, supra n. __. This sentiment appears in a number of other accounts, including the one
by Sean Hagan, General Counsel of the IMF and one of the architects of the SDRM. See Hagan, supra n. __ at 39094 (2005); Melvyn Westlake, Battle of the Heavyweights, Emerging Markets, Sept. 27, 2002, at 16; A Better Way to
Go Bust, Economist, Feb. 1, 2003, at 64; See also Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How
Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured? 53 Emory L. J. 783, 766 (2004) (separating objections to
the SDRM into the more and less “principled” ones).
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See Hagan, supra note__, at 319-20.
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“Developing countries are issuing new bonds that should make it easier to clear up or head off defaults,” The
Economist, May 8, 2003; Deutsche Bank Emerging Markets Daily, February 26, 2003, at 8,
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See Hagan, supra note __ at 320 (citing Adam Lerrick & Allan H. Meltzer, Sovereign Default: The Private Sector
Can Resolve Bankruptcy Without a Formal Court, Q. Int’l Econ. Rep., Apr. 2002, at 2: "With bailouts ruled out, the
private sector is confronted with a choice: accept regulation or find its own solution to make restructuring work.").
See also Barry Eichengreen et al., Crisis Resolution: Next Steps (IMF Working Paper No. WP/03/196, Oct. 2003)
(pointing out that the IIF's embrace of collective action clauses would never have happened in the absence of the
SDRM initiative), available at http:// www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03196.pdf (last visited Nov. 2,
2004).
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Roubini & Setser, Bailouts, supra note __, at 313.
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ii. U.S. Pressure. Beginning in the fall of 2002 Bush Treasury officials appeared to make CACs
a centerpiece of their strategy to eliminate public sector bailouts. Trade and financial press
frequently reported in early 2003 that Treasury arm-twisting caused Mexico and others to try
CACs.76 In a forthcoming book, the leading advocate of CACs in the U.S. Government
characterizes the efforts as broad-based “diplomacy” and persuasion”.77 Some in the market
pointed to Mexico’s special relationship with the United States, and cited unconfirmed rumors of
a quid pro quo.78
iii. G-10 Expert Drafting Group. The working group of officials, convened by the G-10
governments,79 commissioned “eminent lawyers” from relevant jurisdictions to draft model
CACs. The group included partners from leading law firms representing both sovereigns and
their investment bankers, and had the imprimatur of the official sector. One explanation of the
group’s role suggests that it served as a coordinating mechanism to overcome network effects,
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See Dealing With Default, supra note __ (“American pressure also played a part. The Treasury made no secret of
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with U.S. clout working its usual magic, CACs won endorsement from the G-7 and the IMF’s policy-setting
committee of member-country finance ministers, and several emerging-market countries began issuing bonds with
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especially the fear that no one would follow the first mover in adopting CACs.80
iv. Law Firms. Like the last explanation, this one credits the CAC shift to the party that helped
overcome network effects. Choi and Gulati suggested that Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton –
with its large stable of sovereign clients – had disproportionate influence in inducing the CAC
shift. In their account, the CAC shift had roots in the new use of exit consents (another Cleary
Gottlieb invention), which created uncertainty about the value of unanimity and opened a
window for innovation. 81 Cleary Gottlieb’s own firm brochure takes credit for pioneering
innovative techniques in the sovereign debt market, such as collective action clauses.82 The
Cleary Gottlieb story is consistent with Kahan and Klausner’s prediction that large volume
intermediaries drive boilerplate change. Here the elite law firm caused the shift, motivated not
only by the value of the new term to its many clients but also perhaps by the reputational value to
it of being seen as a market leader.83

The Choi-Gulati study ran into criticism from prominent sovereign debt lawyers, including those
they credited with the shift. Lawyers said that the study had missed the plot by giving all earlymoving issuers equal weight, even though the first few were more important than later ones.84
Had the authors understood this dynamic, they would have given more credit to two other law
firms, Sullivan & Cromwell and Arnold & Porter.85
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the Quarles Report by the Group of 10”) (available at http://www.banquefrance.fr/gb/publications/rsf/rsf_112005.htm).
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v. Lee Buchheit. More than any other, the name of one lawyer has been associated with the CAC
saga. He was among the first to urge the adoption of collective action clauses, and among the
first to propose actual draft clauses, in a popular trade journal. He was one of the three New
York lawyers on the G-10 drafting group and a senior partner at Cleary Gottlieb, the firm that
represented both Mexico and Uruguay. An article in Latin Finance put all this together to credit
Buchheit with CAC paternity. 86
vi. Big Institutional Investors. In the wake of the CAC shift, a front-page article in the Wall
Street Journal claimed that big institutional investors – in particular, Mohammed El Erian at
Pimco – induced the shift to CACs.87 Their willingness to buy a large share of Mexico’s first
CAC issue, and the advance assurance that they gave Mexico to that effect, made the deal
possible. Once the deal was a success, the ball was rolling.
vii. Trade Associations. This explanation credits the release of model “marketable” clauses by a
group of seven leading creditors’ associations88 with catalyzing the CAC shift. The so-called
“Gang of Seven” clauses endorsed by buy-side and sell-side investors in New York and London
included an amendment threshold between 85% and 90%, an engagement clause, and a number
of other provisions that addressed creditor concerns with potential misbehavior by the sovereign
debtor. An April 2003 article in Euromoney reasoned that the release of creditor consensus
development of collective action clauses, which represent a market-based response to the hold-out problem
that arises when debt becomes distressed. Collective action clauses were first used by United Mexican
States in its successful February 2003 bond offering, where we represented the underwriters.
(Available at http://www.sullcrom.com/practice/servicedetail.aspx?firmService=21&pdText=PDInfoText3&
pdname=LR021969) (last visited April 30, 2006).
Arnold & Porter is similarly proud:
Firm Advises Brazil on Innovative $1 Billion Global Bond Issue … As the first such bond issue, the deal is
being seen as a major event shaping the policy debate on the resolution of sovereign debt crises, and other
emerging market issuers are starting to follow suit.
(Available at http://www.arnoldporter.com/case.cfm?publication_ID=743) (last visited April 30, 2006).
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clauses signaled market acceptance of CACs in principle, and made their adoption in some form
a foregone conclusion.89
viii. Pre-Emption. This explanation goes specifically to Mexico’s motives, and suggests that
preemption might have been dominant among them.90 Mexican officials said in interviews that
going first allowed them to set a market standard. Gelpern wrote that Mexico may well have
acted out of concern that less creditworthy countries under G-7 pressure would adopt industrysponsored CACs, and pay extra to do it.91 This would create adverse precedent for Mexico to
overcome. In a preemptive strike, Mexico adopted a 75% modification threshold and rejected
most of the other proposed innovations.
ix. Argentina. For nearly three years after its bond default, Argentina simply refused to enter
into meaningful negotiations with its creditors and the IMF.92 Some prominent commentators
said that recognizing how little creditors could do to force sovereigns like Argentina to behave,
“led the private international financial community to become much more willing to endorse
some official reforms to make sovereign debt rescheduling more orderly, most notably through
the use of [CACs] in new international bond issues.”93
x. “Prehistoric” CACs and Inadvertence. We have found only one published story about the
use of CACs in New York law bonds before Mexico, which involved Bulgaria, Kazakhstan,
Qatar, Lebanon, and Egypt. Gugiatti and Richards, who studied these early issues to identify the
effect of CACs on bond prices, report that not only did the market pay little attention, but that the
borrowers themselves seemed unaware, or at least indifferent, to the shift.94 The study notes that
89
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each of these early issuances was documented by the London office of a New York Law firm. In
the authors’ view, the innovation was “somewhat inadvertent” – a combination of the lawyers’
comfort with New York law and their lack of familiarity with Euromarket boilerplate.95 The
firms were doing New York law deals, but cut and pasted contract terms from an English law
form.96
IV.

The Interviews

This section sets out the accounts we have collected from participants in the CAC shift. Our
contacts spoke to us in the expectation of confidential treatment based on the political and
market sensitivity of the information they shared; we have coded the interviews to preserve
anonymity. We proceed roughly in the order of the published explanations above, which form
the background public story of the shift. This way, our materials will come across as overlay –
occasionally adding richness and depth, perhaps more often, altering the appearance of the
underlying story.
i.

SDRM: The Phantom Menace

The overwhelming majority of our contacts connected the CAC shift with SDRM. Only two said
that the CAC shift might have happened without the threat of SDRM; we will return to their
views shortly. Most market participants offered two basic versions of the explanation. In the
first version, the official sector had wanted to foist a statutory regime on the market, but backed
down in the face of market resistance, settling for CACs as “second best”. Here is how one
investor put it:
There were enough parties of interest in the world of finance [opposing SDRM] that
political forces in Washington stood down. The White House listened to this … ‘maybe
Borrowers, 35 Geo. J. Int’l L. 815 (2004); See also Anthony Richards & Mark Gugiatti, Do Collective Action
Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New Evidence from Emerging Markets, 6 Int’l Fin. 415, 421 & n.12 (2003)
(reporting on the degree of indifference among legal advisers in these initial deals to the use of collective action
clauses). Robert Gray, a senior official with ICMA, confirms the Richards and Gugiatti observations and further
suggests that their finding of lawyer indifference to the early changes also extended to the issuers, underwriters, and
investors involved in those initial deals). See Robert Gray, Collective Action Clauses: Theory and Practice, 35 Geo.
J. Int’l L. 693, 703 (2004).
95
See supra note [89].
96
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we were making too many enemies, we need a second best.’ CACs were that second
best.97
In another market view, more common among those familiar with public sector efforts to
promote CACs in the 1990s, officials announced SDRM out of frustration with the market’s
failure to adopt CACs – or any other fix to the collective action problem that governments
foresaw and markets dismissed.98 SDRM was the nuclear fix, a way to ensure that “the private
sector would pay attention finally to what government thinks.”99
Our interviews and correspondence confirm that industry representatives had tried more than
once to trade their acceptance of CACs for the official sector’s commitment to “drop” SDRM,100
which implies that they had thought such a bargain to be within the power of their official
interlocutors. A dozen or so contacts described a particularly contentious gathering of investors,
emerging markets issuers, and G-7 officials hosted by the U.S. Treasury in late September 2002
on the margins of the World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings. The parties reportedly tried to reach
consensus on CACs, but failed in large part because the United States would not take SDRM off
the table.101 One participant described the meeting as a “debacle”. Mexico’s Finance Minister
Francisco Gil Diaz “got up and said forget it, we are never doing CACs!” – a gesture the
Minister appears to have reprised regularly at international gatherings in the run up to February
2003.102
Did the G-7 and the IMF truly aim for a statutory regime, settling for CACs as the face-saving
fallback? Or was SDRM a ploy to induce a market fix to collective action problems, after nearly
97
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a decade of market resistance to official pleas? And were the G-7, and especially the United
States, deliberately driving a hard bargain, holding SDRM over the markets to secure
unconditional surrender on CACs? Interviews with officials suggest a more nuanced story, and
raise the possibility that SDRM itself came of a loss of control by the United States and a
measure of coordination failure among the G-7.
Most accounts of the IMF’s initiative103 start with Argentina. In August 2001, that country
secured its last IMF loan before defaulting on nearly $100 billion in foreign bonds. The Bush
Treasury, eager to distance itself from Clinton-era bailouts,104 was searching for a way to inject
some form of market discipline in the Argentine package. Inspired in part by the financial
engineering of the Brady Plan and in part by its faith in market ingenuity, the Treasury team
pressed the IMF to set aside $3 out of $23 billion for a “market-based, voluntary restructuring
operation”.105 It soon became clear that restructuring $100 billion with $3 billion would take
more magic than engineering. But some of the early design meetings introduced Paul O’Neill,
the eccentric first Treasury Secretary of the second Bush Administration, to negative pledge
constraints in sovereign debt contracts.106 Apparently O’Neill did not take well the prospect that
a contract clause might interfere with debt restructuring for an insolvent sovereign. In
September 2001, he publicly called for an international agreement on sovereign bankruptcy.107
Days earlier, O’Neill had hosted a private breakfast for Horst Koehler, the Managing Director of
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the IMF, and Anne Krueger, his newly-appointed First Deputy.108 Several senior staff were in
attendance. One participant told us that at breakfast, O’Neill “waxed poetically” about
international bankruptcy.109 Another reported O’Neill saying something like, “We need an
international bankruptcy court … and do it by December.”110 The IMF had quietly explored
sovereign bankruptcy analogues several times in the preceding decade, each time without an
action mandate from its major shareholders. For the IMF officials at the Treasury breakfast,
O’Neill’s call signaled a massive institutional boost. Visibly elated, “Horst and Anne sort of
floated out of the place.”111
In contrast, O’Neill’s deputies first took his words as a bit of rhetorical gloss. As they saw it, the
Secretary had identified a problem – inflexible debt contracts – and commissioned a solution.
Statutory sovereign bankruptcy was a possible solution, but one that was obviously costly (at a
minimum, requiring Congressional approval) and more importantly, too dirigiste for most of the
Bush team’s free market sensibilities. One team member, a trained lawyer, suggested that any
necessary bankruptcy functions could be synthetically replicated in a private contract. Initial
conversations with outside experts (mostly academic economists) and staff unearthed the earlier
CAC initiatives, going back to 1996. Senior officials became convinced that “not only was it
possible, it was smarter to do it contractually.”112 But by then, the IMF machine was in full gear
designing the new statutory framework.
Some participants in the August breakfast say they saw right away that O’Neill’s deputies and
Krueger took him completely differently. But Treasury officials, still completing transition to
the new Administration, thought they had time to bring Fund management “back on the
reservation.”113 They miscalculated. Krueger gave her first speech launching SDRM in
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November 2001.114 IMF had sent an advance copy to the Treasury but heard nothing back.
Krueger may have assumed she had what “clearance” she needed; Treasury officials assumed
more substantive consultations would ensue.
Market reaction to Krueger’s speech was quick and scathing. One New York lawyer recalled
that the speech “scared the Bejesus out of” some business contacts: “It’s VIII(ii)(b) again, but
much, much worse!” – referring to an earlier official attempt to sanction nonpayment under
Article VIII(ii)(b) of the IMF Charter.115 A buy-side money manager summarized market
concerns as two-fold: discomfort with “institutionalizing a process by which your contracts
would be trumped” and having that process run by an institution like the IMF, controlled by the
G-7 and exposed to their shifting policy priorities.116 Many others suspected Fund motives, and
accused it of conflicts of interest: the IMF is often the largest creditor of a sovereign in distress.
Once the idea was out, it proved hard to squash. By all accounts, O’Neill had no problem with
CACs, but refused to allow his deputies to end the statutory experiment. A celebrated industry
captain before his Treasury stint, he fancied the idea of different groups competing to design
solutions to his problem.117 Competition began to resemble confrontation the following spring
when Krueger and John Taylor, Treasury Under Secretary for International Affairs, both spoke at
a conference on sovereign debt restructuring at the Institute for International Economics, a
Washington think tank. Krueger delivered a modified version of the first SDRM proposal,
scaling down the IMF’s role.118 Taylor endorsed CACs in a speech that was widely read as
114
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dismissing SDRM as a matter for academic speculation.119 Officials and staff involved in
preparing the speech swear that Taylor had never intended to slight Krueger, a former Stanford
colleague, and certainly did not mean “academic” as a pejorative. The following account is
typical:
He was asked to speak at a conference, he had views to share. Fairly sure he was not
doing it to be Machiavellian. He was being analytical. She thought that the U.S. was
supporting her … There was pressure after for John not to be in Anne’s face … she was
‘slightly’ upset.120
Taylor considered Krueger a friend; he also knew that she was revising the original design –
perhaps he had expected their approaches to converge.121 Looking back, it is hard to see how a
U.S. proposal with no role for the Fund could escape being perceived as profoundly threatening.
In any event, the press and the markets reported the speeches as open conflict between the IMF
and its largest shareholder.122 The bad signal that sent may well have trumped the substance of
either initiative. Days later, Taylor’s new deputy Randal Quarles was in the press endorsing a
two-track approach – where the Fund and the G-7 would explore both CACs and SDRM in an
effort to improve crisis management.123
Krueger had some support inside the Bush White House. But the nature and depth of this
support are a matter of contention. [Taylor recounts in a forthcoming book being called to the
White House and told to go easy on the Fund.]124 Krueger was friendly with National Security
Adviser Condoleezza Rice (both had taught at Stanford). When they occasionally dined
together, Krueger would mention the SDRM, and Rice would respond with general
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encouragement.125 Senior White House staff apparently considered and rejected the idea of
elevating either SDRM or CACs beyond the Treasury.126 A Treasury official characterized
White House interest as “discomfort with the press playing up the conflict between Treasury and
IMF … It was an arcane issue at the White House.”127
National Economic Adviser Larry Lindsey and CEA Chairman Glenn Hubbard were among the
few top White House officials to weigh in on the substance of the debate, generally in line with
the contractual approach.128 Hubbard even gave a keynote speech at an IMF conference on
SDRM. He proposed a mix of contractual innovation and a voluntary dispute resolution
mechanism that echoed some features of the SDRM, combined with restructuring incentives and
tighter conditions on IMF lending.129 Even though in substance Hubbard’s idea was much closer
to Taylor’s than to Krueger’s, his rhetoric was telling – he called CACs a “Treasury proposal”, as
if to distance the rest of the Administration from the controversy. Some Treasury officials saw
Hubbard’s “third way” as a worrisome diversion.130 But for IMF staff the speech sounded the
death knell for SDRM – they had assumed that the White House was with Krueger.131 Hours
later, things got surreal as Quarles delivered yet another ritual endorsement of the two tracks,
promoting the clauses but encouraging the IMF to keep refining their SDRM proposal.132 An
IMF staffer complained privately that he wished the United States would just end the charade
125
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and put his colleagues out of their misery.
Active controversy around SDRM and CACs lasted for about a year and a half from Krueger’s
first speech. Some senior U.S. and IMF officials suggested quietly it was a no-win battle, and
tried to distance themselves from both sides to the extent possible.133 As best we know, their
reasons were some combination of believing that neither initiative was likely to succeed, that
CACs were marginal, while SDRM was too intrusive. Some said that at the Fund, Krueger
“owned” the initiative so completely that it left little room for others of her stature.134 “It was
going to be her legacy” and was her battle to fight.135 On the other hand, our contacts often
pointed to a small cohort of “true believers” in SDRM, comprising Krueger and several senior
IMF staff, sustained in their design work by encouragement from O’Neill, the desire to boost the
role of the IMF, at least acquiescence from the White House, and importantly, by support from
European capitals.
By the end of the 1990s, European officials had come to lead the opposition to outsize IMF
packages. Germany’s insistence on hard lending limits typified this view, as did an influential
joint paper by the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada, advocating debt standstills and
lending limits.136 Unlike the newly minted Bush appointees, many European representatives in
the CAC-SDRM debate were veterans of the “private sector involvement” wars of the late
1990s.137 Wary of discretion, which had let the United States steamroll over their objections, and
weary of the old CAC initiatives that looked in retrospect like a fig-leaf for U.S.-led bailouts, the
Europeans wanted firm crisis management rules.138 SDRM was their chance, thanks to the space
133
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created by O’Neill.139 Europe’s over-representation in the IMF Board made its support
impossible to ignore, even if the U.S. alone could have blocked the supermajority vote to amend
the Charter.140
With the U.S. tied to the parallel tracks for as long as O’Neill was in office, the most vocal
resistance to SDRM in the IMF Board came from large emerging market issuers, notably Mexico
and Brazil.141 One official called the SDRM “a wrong idea at the wrong time”, noting flatly that
if it had prevailed, his country would have lost all market access.142 In private, borrowers also
worried about losing access to IMF funds; some raised the IMF’s conflict of interest.143 In
public, they framed their resistance in the language of large-volume market issuers, as in this
example: “From the point of view of [this issuer], all discussions of default, possibility of
making default easier, were not genial. … Our scenario is not default.”144
Mexico’s CAC issue came two months after O’Neill’s stormy departure from office in December
2002.145 It is hard to speculate whether either event alone was sufficient to shelve SDRM. The
IMF conference where Hubbard and Quarles appeared to speak at cross-purposes came between
O’Neill’s resignation and the appointment of his successor, John Snow, and may have been a
symptom of the interregnum. (Mexico’s spokesman at the conference reiterated his country’s
based system by Meltzer and others; he does not dwell on the disagreements between the Clinton Administration
and its European allies. Id. at 641. European officials were not against CACs – most came across to us as both
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opposition to both tracks, suggesting that finance leaders should better focus on building
hospitals, not morgues.) Most of our interviews tie O’Neill’s departure, SDRM and Mexico’s
issue together, as in this version, which is unusual for bringing broader geo-strategic issues to
bear on the CAC-SDRM debate:
Of course now we had an alternative, we could see the alternative happening, it is easier
to say we do not have to talk about [SDRM] anymore. Maybe it is easier for the U.S. not
to support SDRM. Period. Certainly O’Neill had to be gone. With O’Neill’s departure,
[the U.S.] could say to the MD, the U.S. will never support this, and you need our vote.
At about the same time, there was a big blowup at the UN about Iraq – after that, it
became clear the UN process was failing, falling apart … With those U.S.-European
battles, it made no sense to have battles [at the IMF] for no good reason. When Koehler
said the U.S. is against, it’s over …Koehler was never a true believer.146
In retrospect, it looks like O’Neill’s initial set-up of a competition between IMF staff and his
own framed the entire episode. As Taylor put it diplomatically, “The existence of an alternative
proposal advocated by the IMF (and in particular by my colleague Anne Krueger) also had
bearing on our financial diplomacy plan.”147 One official recalled O’Neill saying, “’If SDRM
solves it, good, if your way solves it, good. He was very, quite direct. ‘Read my lips – I want
the problem solved. Don’t swat Anne down. I’m behind Anne and you will get in line.’
Awkward – … In the end, I think it was a good thing from the point of view of process that we
didn’t swat down the SDRM. …With O’Neill out of the building … the heart of Treasury
support was gone. … Mexico moved, others moved … ’We said all along, may the best process
win, and it did.’”148 But another contact suggested that O’Neill’s insistence on keeping SDRM
alive may have done more harm than good:
Some people feel that [SDRM] was a forcing factor. I am not sure. Private sector was so
alarmed, it ran the risk of scaring [them] away from the whole deal. Did not make much
difference. … The underlying story is O’Neill versus Snow. O’Neill wanted to have it
[SDRM] out there. Snow was very comfortable about ending SDRM. The whole thing
changed.149
Perhaps the greatest irony of the episode is that by all accounts, SDRM’s ultimate chances of
implementation had always been slim to none. The IMF charter is an international treaty;
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amending the charter requires a super-majority vote of its Board and approval by member states,
which for the United States would implicate the U.S. Congress.150 The leading economic policy
officials in the Bush Administration came to office deeply skeptical of the role of the
international financial institutions, and especially the way in which the Clinton Administration
had used them to battle international crises. Several years before his appointment, Taylor had
even suggested abolishing the IMF altogether (he later distanced himself from the statement).151
The idea that this Administration would spend political capital to expand IMF power at the
expense of private contracts, and that the skeptical Congress would blithely go along, verges on
inconceivable.152 One long-time European observer put the skepticism in broader perspective:
I always thought SDRM was dead in the water – because countries just do not cede
sovereignty. The Rey Report said as much. It was a waste of the Fund’s time, anyone’s
time. It was not a credible alternative.153
Many other contacts, including investors and emerging markets officials who worked hard to
defeat the proposal, said they had always assumed it would die – eventually.154 As some of the
later accounts suggest, eventually may not have been soon enough.
In sum, if the SDRM initiative had a role in the CAC shift – and our interviews certainly suggest
that it did – then this may be the ultimate story of inadvertence. The political transition in the
United States and the Argentine crisis, bound up in this story, are the salient distinguishing
features between the successful shift in 2003 and the failed official campaign for CACs in the
late 1990s. A brand-new, enterprising U.S. Treasury Secretary, unaware of the old CAC
initiatives, got peeved at the negative pledge clause in Argentina’s bonds, and unleashed a
powerful statutory alternative that made CACs seem handsome by comparison to the markets.
O’Neill’s intervention empowered IMF management (led by another Bush appointee) and longtime European advocates of rule-based crisis resolution, but also energized his own deputies to
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work hard to preempt them. The White House allowed the space for competition by deeming the
controversy too technical and insignificant to intervene. The entire kafuffle lasted long enough
either to convince the markets of the merits of the contractual solution, or to create enough
uncertainty about the outcome to make it worth the markets’ while to preempt the debate.
ii.

Invisible Hands

Bush Administration officials came up with CACs in the fall of 2001, knowing little or nothing
of the prior life of the initiative in the 1990s. One official implicated in the clauses’ comeback
described a tinge of awkwardness when learning he had re-invented the CAC wheel: “’It’s
round, it rolls, look what I’ve discovered!’”155 A staffer privy to both iterations of the CAC
campaign was more charitable: “There was a lot of pressure for a radical alternative, and to his
credit, John [Taylor] did not yield to the pressure, but dusted off the CACs.”156 The subtlety was
lost on some market observers:
I did not pay much attention to the early rounds – it did not make sense to. We thought it
would go away. And for a period it seemed they [CACs] vanished … and then they
reemerged. I try to stay away from Washington, I am not a lobbyist – here Washington
lobbied us, invaded … I thought they were on a tear to fix … but fix the wrong thing.
Boy they sure got CACs. Now you can bind 25%.157
In this and other accounts, market-based change came courtesy of successive Washington
invasions. This explanation raises yet more questions. If U.S. pressure catalyzed the CAC shift
in 2003, what were the ingredients of the winning strategy? Why did U.S. advocacy fail the first
time around in the 1990s? And did the early history of the initiative contribute to its eventual
success?
Mexico’s 1994 crisis solidified the public consensus that the era of bond crises had arrived, and
was worse than the 1980s loan crisis.158 Officials and experts pointed out that foreign bank loan
restructuring took a decade, and both the instruments and the creditors were fewer and more
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flexible in the 1980s.159 By the mid-1990s, emerging market sovereign bonds had acquired a
reputation as a near-sacred asset class partly because they seemed technically difficult to
restructure, but also partly for their association with the moral commitment the official sector
had made in sponsoring the Brady Plan.160 The Bradies were meant to be inflexible to instill fear
of default in the hearts of wayward debtors, and even contained a provision that turned out in
retrospect to be near-comical bluster – a promise that they would never be restructured.
Beginning in 1995, academic and trade journals began publishing lawyers’ bond restructuring
proposals; yet more ideas circulated informally in the sovereign debt community.161
On the official side, concern about bond restructuring went hand in hand with concern about
mega-bailouts: many in the finance circles fumed at the $50 billion Mexico package.162 Central
banks took the lead in making sure it did not happen again. A series of central bank deputies’
meetings beginning in February 1995 produced a G-10 working party under the leadership of
Jean-Jacques Rey, the Belgian central bank deputy chosen, in the words of one participant,
“because he was neutral – not American but not crazy Bundesbank – no bailouts.”163 But the
Rey group’s mandate was “a reaction to what you [the United States] did – there has got to be a
better way of handling sovereign liquidity crises.”164 The fruits of the group’s work, known
informally as the Rey Report, came out in May 1996. It considered and rejected statutory
sovereign bankruptcy as neither feasible nor appropriate (suggesting private sector entities may
wish to study the issue further) and proposed among other things, a “market-led process to
develop for inclusion in sovereign debt instruments contractual provisions that facilitate
159
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consultation and cooperation” between debtors and creditors, as well as among creditors. This
specifically included majority modification to improve restructuring predictability.165
It is not entirely clear how the contract proposal made its way into the report. Some later
commentators credit a paper by economists Barry Eichengreen and Richard Portes,
commissioned by the British Treasury and the Bank of England in connection with their work in
the Rey group.166 But Eichengreen and Portes themselves, as well as working party members we
interviewed, describe the bond clause proposals as “already out there” and part of the crisis
management discussion.167 Veterans of the 1980s crisis, some of whom participated in the Rey
effort, said that the lengthy, costly and traumatic restructuring delays they attributed to highmajority and unanimity requirements in loan contracts played a big role in framing their
concerns.168 Some private practitioners had expressed similar worries several years before the
1994 Tequila Crisis.169
In market surveys commissioned for the Rey Report, investors roundly dismissed the contract
proposal:
Market participants opposed any change to the present structure of bond contracts. The
general view among the respondents was that bonds represent a simple promise by the
borrower to pay, and their attractiveness as an investment vehicle reflects their character
as easily transferable, unencumbered and difficult-to-restructure securities.170
To be fair, investors also dismissed sovereign bankruptcy and bondholder committees – they
pretty much wanted to be left alone. We were privy to similar outreach efforts later in the late
1990s, which elicited roughly the same market response.
Nevertheless the clause proposal, initially mocked as a “tinny deliverable,”171 survived and
prospered for almost five years. After the Rey Report, clauses reappeared in a report on crisis
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resolution by the Group of Twenty-Two systemically significant economies in the aftermath of
the Asian financial crisis, and as part of the International Financial Architecture Initiative in
1999. One staffer suggested this resilience was due to a combination of intellectual appeal and
bureaucratic convenience:
[CACs offered a] very elegant, simple theoretical framing. It worked in the economics
world. Collective action problems are a well-accepted category that a legal problem falls
into – a well-accepted model of market failures … Government is only involved if there
is a market failure. It is easy to show market failure here. …Very powerful framing
overlapped with the concern in the legal world whether document standards in New York
law Brady Bonds made sense -- set up in a way -- exit -- no more restructuring -- that
made it harder down the line. This simple accepted model of potential problem that
worked both in legal and economic world – there was an element of truth to the
arguments – got elevated and expanded into a notion that because CACs are not there,
there is no market solution, the only option is a bailout. Somehow it went from “absence
of CACs makes restructuring harder than it should be” to “there will always be bailouts”.
Jeff Sachs was pushing international bankruptcy172 – seemed too far. Traded securities
difficult to restructure – means a bailout next time – the Mexico problem – not tenable.
As always the case, you put the unattractive options as the first bullet and the third,
everyone picks the option in the middle. The option in the middle was to do something
that makes tradable bonds easier to restructure.173
The intellectual appeal story is plausible partly because of the large number of academic
economists involved in CAC policies over time. Lawrence Summers and John Taylor are the
best-known of the lot, but the economics PhDs involved over time and at the highest levels
numbered in the dozens. It helps explain the search for market failures, and the willingness to
commission academic studies in support of the effort.
The bureaucratic story requires elaboration. Virtually all the officials who discussed the topic
with us made clear that their advocacy of CACs related to a bigger policy objective. If Mexicostyle full bailouts were no more, bond restructuring was inevitable. In the late 1990s, CACs
became part of the effort to signal that the official sector would not stand in the way of sovereign
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bond restructuring, and in some cases may even demand it. The implications of that judgment
translated into two big policy shifts in the late 1990s under the rubric of “private sector
involvement in crisis management,” or “PSI”.174 First, the Paris Club of government-togovernment creditors would condition its relief on the sovereign debtor’s commitment to seek
private bond restructuring terms comparable to the official concessions.175 Second, the IMF
would extend to bonds its willingness to finance countries in default on private debt.176 Several
participants said that at the time, CACs ended up on the “laundry list” of “things to be for” in
operationalizing PSI.177 Despite three years of market resistance beginning with the Rey Report
investor surveys, the clauses still had an inoffensive, vaguely market-friendly ring to the official
ear.
But in the late 1990s CACs never quite overcame their status as an adjunct initiative. A former
Clinton White House official suggested that Treasury Secretaries Robert Rubin and Lawrence
Summers never seemed eager to push hard on the CAC front.178 Several staffers observed that
Rubin and Summers had expressed their respective reservations differently:
Rubin was happy to have us talk about it, but would not have supported drafting model
clauses. …“These guys have a problem coming down the pike – [they will have to]
restructure bonds – if they can’t do it, this is when it will happen. This will not be solved
until they believe it is a problem, and when they do, then they will solve it better than we
ever had.” Larry was worried that it would make us look feckless. We publicized it a
certain amount, but how they structure contracts is not our business. If this is our primary
recommendation and they do not do anything about it, we look feckless.179
The delicate state of the global economy weighed heavily against regulation or even heavy
pressure on market participants: “Although we believed that CACs would not in any basic sense
174
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change the situation, [they were a] highly charged symbolic political thing since the Rey
Report.” Moving precipitously might “screw up fragile equilibrium.”180 Mulling the CACs’
eventual success, another participant in the Clinton-era debates admitted being torn between
feeling “sheepish – they made it happen when we could have done it in 1999-2000 – and what I
used to think then … which is that … in the hierarchy of priorities … it is not number one,
number two, or number three.”181
The overall tone of the PSI effort of the 1990s was more burden-sharing than privatization.
CACs were part – even if the mildest part – of a policy package that signaled “we want banks to
take a hit.”182 The official sector was not about to get out of the crisis management business;
rather, private creditors that got a subsidy post-Mexico would now be asked to pay their way. In
the late 1990s, the official sector was essentially united around bond comparability and lending
into arrears on bonded debt. These were measures that governments could and did implement on
their own, with minimal cooperation from the private sector. Once they did, officials could wait
and see how bond restructurings might pan out. Within two years, Pakistan, Ukraine and
Ecuador had secured high participation rates in distressed bond exchanges without significant
litigation.183 Of these, Ecuador was especially influential because it managed to restructure New
York law Brady Bonds without CACs, thanks in large part to another market-generated
contractual innovation – exit consents.184
The context had changed by the time CACs reemerged in 2002, several years after the Paris Club
and IMF policies had been implemented. Large IMF packages were going strong and getting
even larger under the new U.S. Administration, which had made opposition to bailouts an
important plank of its foreign economic policy.185 The new U.S. leadership framed this
opposition as leaving the market to its own devices – getting the public sector out of crisis
180

Interview 010306. For a sense of the international economic environment and public perceptions of the role of
the U.S. economic policy team, see Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Committee to Save the World, Time Magazine,
February 15, 1999, at http://www.time.com/time/asia/asia/magazine/1999/990215/cover1.html.
181
Interview 102105
182
Interview 010306
183
See e.g. Interview 091106, suggesting that the Paris Club was reasonably satisfied with the market’s “practical,
pragmatic” response to bond comparability.
184
Lee C. Buchheit, How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. December 2000, at 17, and
Buchheit & Gulati, Exit Consents, supra n. __.
185
Roubini & Setser, supra n. __ at __ and Tarullo, supra n. __ at 651.

40

management, rather than making the private sector pay.186 On the other hand, for many
European officials SDRM seemed like a natural next step in escalating the PSI debate.
The free-market contingent at the U.S. Treasury needed an alternative that would promise to
reduce bailouts, empower market forces, and look credible enough to preempt SDRM. From that
perspective, CACs – long rejected by Wall Street – were arguably the worst candidate. On the
other hand, once SDRM was out of the box, the time constraint was real, especially if one
believed as some did that the debate itself was harmful to the markets. No other palatable
alternative had materialized. Republican officials may have found special philosophical appeal
to a fix that literally “came from the markets” in the form of standard English-law contracts, and
bonus bureaucratic appeal to a fix that looked familiar and essentially harmless to the finance
officials in all the major industrial countries and even some emerging markets countries that had
to buy into CACs to make the shift happen. Within two years, CACs went from being a symbol
of “bail-ins” to being a symbol of market-friendly reasonableness.187
Taylor made a point of noting the early history of CACs in his public statements and private
outreach.188 Several officials specifically credited the education efforts of the 1990s with the
initiative’s quick progress in the 2000s, speculating that if CACs had first sprung up on the eve
of Argentina’s default, they would have taken another decade to adopt.189 Most of our
interviews with investors and emerging markets officials suggest limited to no knowledge of the
history. Some of this may be due to personnel changes. One executive prominent in the 2003
shift speculated that he was too junior to have been included in the CAC conversations of the late
1990s.190 (A Washington team met with the head of his operation in 1999.) Another investor
privy to both iterations of the initiative described a subliminal learning process: “People were
worn out … also knew that the public sector lived for that stuff and would never wear out.”191 In
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retrospect, early advocacy certainly increased the volume and sharpened the focus of CAC
information in the public domain; the drumbeat also raised awareness of bond contracts among
some creditors and helped frame the mandate for groups like EMCA, discussed below.
For European officials, the life of CACs between 1995 and 2003 looked much more like a
continuous effort ten years in the making, 192 even if it proceeded in fits and starts and in distinct
phases:
As for the two iterations, there are clear distinctions. I do not think they are completely
and absolutely distinct – they [led] into one another. Excuse the analogy, it is like the
process of labor – one contraction leading into another. But they were significantly
different. … People who think of success or failure in the international domain bring up
the idea of a hegemon. The fact that the U.S. was behind this was necessary but wasn’t
sufficient. The U.S. was certainly behind the first phase as well.193
One official divided the policy push into three phases – the 1995-1996 Rey Report, which was
essentially a G-10 only exercise outreach notwithstanding, the 1998 G-22 report on crisis
resolution, authored by a group of officials from major industrial and emerging market
economies in equal numbers, and the “Taylor-Quarles” phase, which mobilized an even broader
range of actors, including lawyers and diverse members of the investor community.194 Another
European described a more diffuse process:
I do not particularly subscribe to individuals make a difference school of thought. If the
Rey report had not been written, if Eichengreen-Portes hadn’t produced the report, if
O’Neill hadn’t encouraged Krueger to give her SDRM speech – the Quarles working
group, Taylor’s advocacy, Buchheit’s advocacy (and these people were important
advocates) – would have taken place in a vacuum.195
On balance, even if market outreach had limited visible effect, it seems fair to trace the education
and buy-in process among officials to 1995, and for a small but important subset, even further
back to the restructurings of the late 1980s. There is some irony to the fact that CACs’ most
important and powerful proponents in the official sector – Deputy-level Bush Treasury officials
– were also the last to arrive on the scene. It helped that their career staff were familiar with the
clauses, and that their principal international interlocutors knew about them and were in principle
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open to them. The accretion of press and academic studies that made CACs look harmless at
worst, and often helpful, boosted the officials’ rhetorical arsenal and increased their comfort with
advocating new terms.196
The way in which the new team pursued CACs is instructive. As Under Secretary for
International Affairs, John Taylor was head of Treasury’s international division; Quarles was his
deputy. They oversaw an organization of 150 or so staff, organized into “functional” and
geographic offices197 -- a division common in international bureaucracies. Functional offices are
responsible for policies that span geographic regions, such as international debt, development,
trade, investment, terrorist finance, and U.S. participation in institutions such as the IMF and the
World Bank. “Country” offices are responsible for policy with respect to specific countries and
regions, and generally maintain staff-level communications with other finance ministries and
central banks. The functional office responsible for U.S. policy in the IMF and the G-7 process
had the “lead” in staffing the CAC initiative, with input from in-house lawyers and the office of
the U.S. representative at the IMF.
Between Krueger’s first speech in November 2001 and the summer of 2002, the lead office
collected research on the clauses, and consulted with academic economists, some emerging
markets issuers, and selected market participants (mostly trade groups and research economists
at large investment banks). Early efforts focused on including CAC advocacy in important
policy signaling documents, such as G-7 communiqués, speeches and other public statements by
senior U.S. officials, meetings with foreign counterparts, and market outreach. This was
essentially similar to the late 1990s tactics.
At their meeting in April 2002, the G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors adopted
an Action Plan to strengthen crisis prevention and resolution. 198 G-7 ministers’ meetings
usually yield statements and communiqués, broader-brush documents meant to signal economic
trends and policy intentions. An “action plan” signaled new urgency and specificity – an
196
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emphasis on results reflecting the public style of the new U.S. team. “Contingency clauses”
were the first item in the plan, followed by limits on IMF lending, greater transparency in official
decision-making, and further work on SDRM (which “would take time”). The one-page plan
described the clauses in considerable detail, tracking Taylor’s speech a few weeks earlier. CACs
also appeared in G-7 statements in the 1990s, but their prominence in this “action” document
meant a promotion.
One official described the plan as a U.S.-British compromise to diffuse European support for
SDRM and present a united G-7 front for CACs. Shortly after giving the speech that launched
the CAC campaign, Taylor traveled to Russia. On the way back, he stopped for a G-7 meeting in
London. There, Taylor and his U.K. counterpart agreed to frame CACs as a predicate for
limiting IMF lending in crisis – a policy long advocated by the Europeans.199 For the Clinton
Treasury, CACs were marginal and strict limits were unacceptable (and in any event not
credible); for their successors, both CACs and limits sent a message against bailouts. Concerned
that the other G-7 members would see any U.S-British deal as suspect, Taylor and his colleague
asked the Canadian deputy to present what became the Action Plan.200
Everyone reports that Treasury’s CAC strategy shifted either in the summer of 2002, or
following the disastrous meeting with issuers and investors in September.201 Staff in “country”
offices were charged with learning the issuance pipeline for their region in the last quarter of
2002 and early 2003, working with in-house lawyers and using informal market contacts. The
lead functional office put together a composite log and coordinated an intensified outreach plan
with calls from Taylor, Quarles, and other officials to finance ministers, deputies, and debt
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managers in the issuing countries. With issuers’ permission, U.S. officials and staff also
contacted the lawyers and investment bankers involved.
Our official sector contacts were eager to stress that there was no “arm-twisting”, that no threats
were made and no rewards were promised. Taylor and others have described an exercise in
persuasion; 202 the briefings and reports we have seen do nothing to refute this characterization.
It is difficult to ascertain how the conversations were perceived on the other end. While none of
our investor and emerging markets contacts would admit to having their own arms twisted, many
seemed certain that twisting was going on elsewhere. U.S. officials and staff involved in the
calls describe the response as mixed – some ministers knew nothing of the clauses; others said
they had heard issuing with CACs would be costly. Everyone was polite, but no one volunteered.
Smaller, shakier issuers said they could not afford to jeopardize their market access; others said
they had no plans to default, did not need new clauses, and would not risk paying a penalty for
no good reason. 203 The outreach log from January 2003 records lots of “broadly supportive”
and “maybe next time” sentiment. Issuers pointed to the bankers, bankers pointed to the issuers,
everyone pointed to the investors. One prominent advocate painted this picture:
Don’t think any of them saw it as in their own interest. Lawyers – why should they
change? They have a template, they are making good money. Countries risk the yield
going up. Imagine a finance minister [who is] responsible for spreads going higher.
Investment community saw it as taking power away from them…204
Against this background, broadening investor outreach was a key aspect of the new strategy. As
noted earlier, in the first half of 2002, officials were in frequent contact with trade associations
and sell-side research analysts. The buy-side was usually represented in these discussions by
members of EMCA, a group that emerged out of Ecuador’s Brady Bond default in 1999.205
EMCA had been vocal in opposing any contract change that would diminish investor
protections.206 By the end of 2002, U.S. officials engaged with a broader cross-section of buyside investors, including large investors who reached out to the Treasury and tried to distance
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themselves from EMCA positions.207 On the sell-side, the team shifted focus from research to
bankers “actually doing deals”:
After we really got down into the dirt [in late 2002], making calls to the debt managers in
the countries and to the real live investment bankers actually doing the deals, these
people knew very little about the whole CAC debate. It was quite astonishing. The people
doing the deals hadn't been going to the conferences, could have cared less, hadn't heard
much from the conference goers, and didn't know much at all. They just knew how to
generate fees. So, the private sector talking heads weren't worth much.208
By late 2002, outreach to issuers suggested that no single country was willing to go first. As an
alternative, the U.S. Treasury and its allies in the investor community tried to get a group of
highly rated issuers, potentially including Mexico, Korea, Poland and South Africa, to announce
together their intention to issue with CACs. The announcement would not be linked to any
particular issue that might fail. To set the stage, they planned a meeting with the target issuers
in late February, a week or so before John Snow’s first G-7 Finance Ministerial. The objective
was to have large investors reassure the countries that they were willing to buy their debt with
CACs and did not expect to charge a penalty.
At the last minute, Mexico canceled. It later turned out that Mexican officials were meeting with
their bankers and lawyers to plan for the country’s first CAC issue.

By many accounts, U.S.

officials found out about the issue shortly before the launch. According to Mexican officials, the
Finance Minister broke the news casually at the end of a lunch with the new Treasury
Secretary.209 One senior U.S. official describes intense coordination leading up to the launch,
where Treasury pledged and delivered a public statement of support and procured similar
backing from the G-7; others suggest this was a compressed process following Mexico’s surprise
revelation.210 Within days of Mexico’s announcement, at Snow’s first G-7 meeting, the United
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States signaled the end of the two tracks. SDRM was officially shelved in April.211
Just as SDRM was identified with Anne Krueger, in 2002-2003 many came to see CACs as John
Taylor’s initiative. Some observers familiar with early CAC efforts said Taylor’s voluntary
contractual initiative was doomed on arrival. Comments from the audience at his April 2002
speech predicted nothing would happen without a government mandate; hallway chatter
bordered on disparaging – but Taylor seemed undaunted. 212 In less than a year, he proved them
all wrong. For a non-lawyer, Taylor had an impressive grasp of how key clauses worked; he
missed no opportunity to raise CACs in speeches and testimony, and asked for frequent progress
reports on the initiative. He was deeply invested in the targeted, intensive outreach. Our
contacts at all levels described encounters where Taylor – an exceptionally mild-mannered man
– showed visible frustration with the slow progress to CACs, most notably in late 2002. One
person remembered getting a call while Christmas-shopping at Target -- “Nothing is happening,
we need to do something!”; another only tangentially involved with CACs recalled Taylor’s
reaction to a CAC-less bond that had gone forward without Treasury’s knowledge -- “There is no
excuse, we should be calling everyone!”213
Some suggest CACs made sense as a defensive move on Taylor’s part – “the principal aim was
to stop SDRM and his mad boss.”214 Yet among all U.S. participants in the CAC episode, only
academic economists (of which he is one) expressed Taylor’s level of enthusiasm for the clauses’
substantive value and their potential importance in crisis. Taylor’s website puts CACs among
his most important accomplishments at the Treasury, under the headline “Essential Reform of the
International Financial System: Collective Action Clauses”, and alongside Iraq’s reconstruction,
terrorist financing, and China’s exchange rate. In speeches, he has credited the success of the
CAC effort partly to the post-9/11 spirit of international cooperation. We have no way of
knowing whether this conviction was genuine; if it were, we can only speculate on the reasons.
But we cannot help wondering whether a cooler, more pragmatic approach to CAC advocacy in
2002 might have failed just as its predecessors did in the late 1990s: “History needs a midwife in
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this situation. John was the midwife.”215
iii.

Ritual Experts

Several published accounts of the CAC shift focus on the role of experts, especially lawyers and
economists, in educating the officialdom and the markets. Our interviews suggest that shift
participants used expertise in unexpected ways.
We have already noted the impetus that economic theory gave to the clause initiative by framing
the bondholder collective action problem and the holdout dilemma.216 Two other instances of
expert deployment stand out in the CAC campaign. The first is the eminent lawyers’ team
commissioned to draft model clauses under the auspices of a G-10 working group chaired by
Quarles. The second is the group of econometric studies that asked whether investors demand a
higher price for bonds with CACs than for those without.
In June 2002, shortly after the release of the G-7 Action Plan, the G-10 established a working
group of officials to infuse more content in the CAC exhortations.217 Quarles was in the chair.
We have no evidence that the group was intended as a “counter-design” project to balance the
IMF’s work on SDRM; however, in retrospect it certainly appears to have played some such
function. The group’s product, released in just three months, contained two parts: an official
report recommending clauses for inclusion principally in New York law bonds, and a set of
model clauses drafted by an advisory group of “eminent lawyers” who represented sovereign
debtors and creditors in jurisdictions where most external sovereign debt is issued (England,
Germany, Japan and New York). The effect was to produce a tangible alternative to SDRM and
the industry clauses released four months later, an alternative that had “intellectual heft”218 and
appeared to come pre-endorsed by major countries and law firms in the sovereign market.
Quarles’ personal role in the enterprise was critical. Before joining the Bush Administration, he
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was a partner at Davis Polk & Wardwell in New York;219 he had also held a domestic finance
appointment in the Bush I Treasury. In his new government stint he soon gained a reputation as
an engaged listener, a quick thinker and a dynamic interlocutor even among those who disagreed
with him. One sell-side banker who met Quarles several times described him as “that guy who
looked like a died-in-the-wool Republican” – and in the same breath recalled being “pleasantly
surprised” with his willingness to listen and delve into substance.220
Some said the drafting effort was Quarles’ idea; others saw his chairmanship as a U.S. effort to
control G-10 mission creep. Belgian officials in particular were keen to use the CAC campaign
to bolster the role of the G-10, a forum where Belgium and other “small Europeans” not part of
the G-7 play an important role. Even some European participants in the working group
characterized it at least in part as a Belgian play for relevance.221 We heard this sentiment from
the U.S. side:
I was so glad that Randy chaired it. … After the G-7 supported [clauses], the G-10
decided this would be something to do. It is a group always looking for something to
do.222
Taylor was not at the meeting that sanctioned the working group, and though he went along with
it, he was never entirely comfortable with the appearance of officials prescribing contract text to
market participants.223 He had a point: even as the group’s report put distance between its own
recommendations and the eminent lawyers’ model clauses, and even as insiders all attested to
Quarles’ scrupulous enforcement of that distance in the process, virtually all our market contacts
perceived the model as the official position on the merits. This was especially significant with
respect to the 75% amendment threshold for “reserve matters” (key financial and legal terms):
Randy was not shy about 75%. The report said certain countries, certain profiles, certain
problems … but 75% is the mandated number.224
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Other G-10 recommendations for New York law bonds included trustees or permanent
bondholder representatives, elected bondholder representatives to negotiate in restructuring
(engagement), brakes on acceleration and litigation, and additional disclosure by the issuer.225
The extent to which the G-10 effort helped convince some of the early movers is a matter of
debate. One of the “eminent lawyers” who was also involved in an early CAC issue suggested
that “[t]he G-10 report gave enough legitimacy to the use of the clause” for issuers to
experiment.226 A U.S. official said that the G-10 template added to Mexico’s comfort.227 But at
least some Mexican officials expressed concern at the proliferation of drafting and discussion
fora: “discussions at IIF, G-10, U.S. – process not leading anywhere. It was seen as reopening
every single item in the contract.”228 Soon U.S. officials found themselves reassuring some
issuers that the G-10 would not make a fuss if they went ahead with clauses different from the
template.229
By late 2002-early 2003, some in the United States began to worry that G-10 had started a
“runaway process”, with other groups threatening to form on the heels of the Quarles-led effort.
European support for a code of conduct for sovereign debt management230 and renewed efforts to
include CACs in the debt issued by EU member states were threatening to dilute the focus on a
core set of clauses and a core group of issuers.231
Mexico soon made the concerns moot. At the IMF conference on SDRM in January 2003,232
even as Mexican finance officials delivered the customary public nays, they let their U.S.
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counterparts know that they had commissioned a set of clauses from their long-time counsel at
Cleary Gottlieb, and were in principle willing to use them if the conditions were right. Worries
about a price penalty remained the biggest concern.
The question of whether investors would charge more for CACs had haunted the clause
enterprise from the start. It had several distinct iterations. The first often came out in “market
outreach”: when told about CACs, investors who had never heard of them before said flatly that
“orderly” restructuring meant easier restructuring, and that they wanted more money from any
issuer for any clause that made debt easier to restructure. This was true even for investors who
held billions of dollars in English-law CAC bonds. A charitable interpretation of this reaction
has CACs as a signaling device. A country switching to CACs (unlike the country that has them
as a matter of course in its English-law contracts) signaled that it was thinking about default.
This meant that it was more likely to default, and possibly – depending on how the clauses
actually worked in crisis (which no one knew or wanted to spend time figuring out) – would lead
to lower recovery in a restructuring.233 A cynic might describe the investor response as
reflexive: when buying new issues, most do not plan to be around for default, and therefore do
not spend more than a nanosecond on how it might pan out. The only thing to do in a
nanosecond is ask for more money:
CACs’ utility is next to nothing. Guys do not read prospecti – is that the proper plural? –
until next to default. Guys like me will ask for five extra basis points even if it is not
worth it, something to hang our hat on.234
Economists in the academy and in the government might have had a reflexive reaction of a
different sort. If indeed there was a bondholder collective action problem, and if CACs helped
solve it, then somewhere, somehow it all must surface in the bond price. One possible effect
might even be beneficial to the issuer – if CACs reduced deadweight loss to the bondholders
from a prolonged, messy restructuring, then an average bondholder that wanted to get a deal
done quickly might forego a few basis points for the sake of a smoother process. On the other
233
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hand, to the extent the country had to convince fewer creditors to accept its restructuring
proposal, it might offer a worse deal to the marginal bondholder235 -- a price penalty would be in
order.
One senior government economist said he was surprised at the absence of any pricing studies at
the time of the Rey Report in 1995-1996.236 In the next few years, a number of studies appeared,
almost all of which seemed to have been commissioned by official entities (the Bank of England,
the IMF, the Australian Central Bank).237 The studies differed on specifics. But the bottom line
was that the price penalty was going to be minimal or zero. The most prominent of these studies,
by Eichengreen and Mody, 238 suggested that costs would go down for highly rated countries that
used CACs because markets did not expect them to engage in opportunistic defaults; and,
therefore, would value the flexibility that CACs could offer. The implicit message in the
Eichengreen-Mody studies was that the CAC initiative would best be led by a country with a
high credit rating. Early in 2003, Mexico fit the bill perfectly.
Several of our official sector contacts – all economists – said that the pricing studies increased
their comfort level with promoting CACs.239 But one advocate not normally prone to postmodern musings implied that the studies’ value was in large part rhetorical:
We always cited Barry [Eichengreen]’s work. Of course, econometrics can never prove
beyond shadow of a doubt … I used it in advocacy … to neutralize the bad stuff they
were hearing. … If I were [an emerging markets debt manager], I would still be awfully
worried.240
The “bad stuff” came mostly from investors, often mediated through investment bankers. A
number of them were also trained economists. Nevertheless, some big buy-side players
dismissed the pricing studies with flourish:
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Academic studies on pricing were useless as they always are. [They] grossly
misunderstand how investors behave, investor sophistication. The data sets they use
would make [a quantitative analyst] cringe.241
Investment bankers were more muted, but kept coming back to marketing concerns:
They [emerging markets clients] were petrified. Very hard to imagine how [CACs would
result in] terms that were better for them, and very easy to imagine how it could be
worse. The official sector was winking and nodding that they would indemnify – but it is
not clear how they could have done it.242
Even as U.S. officials consistently reported that their Mexican counterparts worried about the
price penalty above all, a senior debt manager recalled that the Mexican team paid little attention
to the pricing studies.243 Of course this did not mean that issuers did not care about pricing,
simply that their thinking about price was largely influenced by factors other than academic
studies.
A sell-side banker explained that by 2003 investors analyzed Mexico much as they did a highgrade U.S. corporate issuer, focusing on discounted cashflows rather than the probability of
default.244 Nevertheless, Mexican officials and their bankers worked hard to make any potential
price effects virtually untestable. On the one hand, the first CAC bond had to be far enough
away from the most liquid issues on Mexico’s yield curve, so that it could not be compared
directly. On the other hand, it could not be so far “off-the-run” as to risk being illiquid, with
CACs getting the blame. The result was a success by all accounts. The most critical analyst
report suggested less than a 25 basis point penalty.245 Most others came in much lower; Mexico
and its advisers maintain it paid none.246 Several months after Mexico’s first issue, traders in the
secondary market no longer bothered to ask whether the bonds they got had CACs; investment
bankers filling their orders no longer volunteered.247
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In sum, the experts’ role in the CAC campaign was hardly straightforward. In the case of the G10 working group and its “eminent lawyers”, the principal benefit of the technical work was not
optimal contract language, but a process that created the appearance of broad-based consensus
and legitimacy for some set of CACs. The G-10 report also created a straw man, a presumption,
and a yardstick by which subsequent model and actual clauses, as well as policy actions, could
be measured. This role is distinct from the one Ahdieh described when he credited the G-10 with
helping overcome network effects: we could get no issuer or investor to tell us that the model
clauses put them at ease or signaled a market-wide shift following the model.248 On the other
hand, by opening half a dozen contract terms, the G-10 process may have increased uncertainty
and created the impetus for Mexico to preempt further public experimentation. Like the model
clauses, the academic pricing studies responded to demand from the official sector. They added
to the comfort level among CAC advocates, and may have helped diffuse demands for a CAC
subsidy. As we show later, they may have helped spur the broader market shift once Mexico
moved. But for much of the CAC campaign, the studies simply fed into a rhetorical loop, a ritual
retort to ritual investor threats about a default scenario that for issuers and investors alike
remained imponderable and unpondered.
iv.

Product Design

The most consistently told story in our interviews is that the lawyers did not push Mexico to
adopt CACs in February 2003. Lawyers and non-lawyers alike agreed that neither Cleary
Gottlieb (representing Mexico), nor Sullivan & Cromwell (representing the lead managers) took
a firm position on the merits before Mexico made up its mind. What role did the lawyers play in
this shift? We asked this question of every contact that might have had knowledge of the
transaction – lawyers, bankers, investors, and officials. Most said that Mexico’s lawyers initially
came across as wary of changing the standard documentation. Mexican finance officials took the
early legal memos to suggest that “with all the legal architecture, CACs did not add much or take
away much. No value added.”249 The decision to shift was made at the Mexican finance
ministry, with the approval of the minister himself. Consultations with Cleary Gottlieb were
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important in the decision mix, but not decisive. Once Mexican officials had made the decision,
they approached Cleary, J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs to execute it. Sullivan & Cromwell
lawyers did not urge their clients to resist and collaborated in the draft.
Our impressions appear to contradict both the Choi-Gulati studies and the original KahanKlausner framing that focused on high-volume intermediaries. Underlying both sets of studies is
an image of lawyers and bankers who design a fix to multiple clients’ problem, with the
incentive to diffuse their invention in the market. But accounts of the process leading up to
Mexico’s issue suggest that virtually no one involved saw the holdout problem as either terribly
problematic for Mexico or in need of an imminent fix. With or without CACs, “deals got done”
is the phrase we heard often and from different lawyers. The real problem on which lawyers and
clients appeared to agree was a proliferation of official initiatives. That required a somewhat
different fix. This observation from a banker involved in the deal is typical:
In [the lawyer’s] mind, CACs were in because my client wants it, Treasury wants it. If
… truly effective fifteen years from now, my client does not care because they do not
plan to default.250
While they did not drive the decision to shift, the lawyers played a critical role in determining the
precise form of the new terms and how the shift was executed. Lawyers and clients described
the process in similar terms. First, Mexican officials commissioned an analytical memo that fed
into the decision to go forward. A little over a month later, the clients decided to go ahead,
called the lawyers down to Mexico City, and asked them to draft the contracts. The deep
relationship between Mexican finance officials and their counsel, going back to the 1980s, was
important in broadening the lawyers’ role.
Our contacts told us that the form of Mexico’s CACs was born of a team effort. The fact that
most deal protagonists knew one another from prior transactions (not surprising given the small
community) surely helped. Both sets of clients and their lawyers sought to keep innovation to a
minimum for fear that the market’s tolerance for innovation was limited. The end result was a
version of the G-10 majority amendment provisions using the 75% threshold, modified to be
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more consistent with standard form documentation for U.S. issuances. Mexico passed on the
other G-10 recommendations, such as a trustee. A lawyer involved in the deal observed that an
85-90% amendment threshold would have made investment bankers’ lives easier, but would
have set disastrous precedent for Mexico.251 Lawyers said they were well-aware of the English
law convention (75% of a quorum) and of corporate restructurings using English law amendment
provisions; we got the strong sense that going above 75% of outstanding principal in New York
law bonds would have been a sign of weakness, at least for a strong credit like Mexico – it
enhanced neither the issuer’s, nor the lawyer’s reputation. Market chatter in response to Brazil’s
use of 85% two months later confirms this view.252 In retrospect, none of the investment bankers
involved in Mexico’s first issue complained to us about 75%.253 On the other hand, one banker
recalled inserting a provision that made certain kinds of exit consents more difficult to obtain;
after Mexico’s documentation became market standard, he expressed regret at not pressing for a
wider range of similar protections.254
Lawyers also argued against elaborate investor consultations before bringing the first issue to
market. They and others worried that instead of allaying investor jitters about CACs, the
meetings would dilute the contract language against Mexico’s interests:
When the U.S. Government was talking to everyone … arranging meetings between the
country and buy-side – We said, Nonsense! … Immediately after launching the deal,
discussions with buy-side – tense – “We want this, we want that …” They were
offended they didn’t get to design the product. In the end, they bought the deal.255
Less than two months after the Mexican prototype hit the markets, Brazil and Uruguay were
offering new variations on CACs. Brazil’s clauses were more conservative, limited to majority
amendment and raising the voting threshold to 85% from Mexico’s 75%. Uruguay’s clauses
were significantly more aggressive. It went with the 75% amendment threshold, and added
aggregation across bond issues – made easier by the fact that Uruguay was exchanging its entire
debt stock. It used a trust structure instead of a fiscal agency agreement, which brought
251

Interview 030106
See infra ns. __ and accompanying text.
253
Interviews 013106, 060706
254
Interview 013106. The provision elevated events of default to the level of a reserved matter requiring a 75% vote
to amend (instead of 2/3), but only if amended in conjunction with an exchange offer. United Mexican States, supra
n. _ at 8.
255
Interview 030106
252

56

collective representation and litigation-retardant benefits. Uruguay also added bondholder
protections in response to investor concerns.
Some contacts suggested that this diversity reflected competition among law firms and lawyers
eager to define the new market standard and reap the reputational benefits. Arnold & Porter
represented Brazil, Cleary Gottlieb represented Uruguay, Sullivan & Cromwell represented
Brazil’s investment banks, and Shearman & Sterling represented the bankers for Uruguay. All
four firms are major players in the sovereign market.
Those involved in the deals did not report a story of competition to set the standard, either among
the individual lawyers or their firms. What we did hear was that even lawyers in the same firm
did not always agree on the form that CACs should take. Mexico and Uruguay both used Cleary
Gottlieb, but adopted different modification provisions. Although Brazil and Mexico both had
Sullivan & Cromwell representing the lead managers, they used different voting thresholds (75%
and 85%) for their early CACs.
The differences over what form CACs should take appear to have broken down in terms of those
lawyers who described CACs primarily as a response to official pressure, and those who looked
to CACs first and foremost to solve the holdout creditor problem. This is not to say the first
group did not understand CACs or did not think they were valuable, but simply that they
conceived of their own mandate differently. Lawyers advising early CAC movers often saw
themselves as part of a team that engineered a deal with high participation and no price penalty,
which in turn would help establish the viability of CACs as a concept, subject to later technical
revision (one lawyer even told the press that his client might revise its CACs as market standards
evolve256). The clauses had to work and be a net improvement for their clients, but above all,
they had to sell and sell quickly – hence this group of lawyers appeared inclined to minimalism.
One lawyer summed up the enthusiasm this way: “We all think having CACs will be better than
not …Not only are they a good idea, but not particularly intellectually challenging.”257
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On the other hand, those who drafted CACs primarily to address a holdout problem tended to
advocate the more aggressive clause forms. Buchheit at Cleary Gottlieb stands out in this group
for having advocated clauses to battle holdouts even before the Rey Report.258 Unlike most
sovereign debt lawyers whose work includes a mix of new issuance and restructuring, Buchheit’s
sovereign practice is almost all restructuring. An elegant and prolific writer, he had published at
least half a dozen articles on CACs in trade and academic press before the Mexico shift. The
first of these appeared in 1991, on the heels of some particularly contentious renegotiations of
syndicated bank loans where individual banks had held the rest hostage.259 In 1998-1999, he
published a series of columns in the leading trade publication proposing specific CACs for
bonds,260 and more articles elsewhere discussing ways of addressing the holdout problem. He
became something of a public intellectual on sovereign debt matters, frequently called upon by
the official sector (for the G-10 “eminent lawyers” group, among other efforts), but also a deeply
polarizing figure among some creditors for his aggressive representation of distressed countries.
At a recent conference, the economist who coined the term “Washington Consensus” introduced
Buchheit as “The Man Who Invented Exit Consents”.
Despite his long public association with CACs, our interviews suggest that Buchheit had little or
no role to play in Mexico’s decision, or the execution of its first CAC issue. But many point to
Buchheit’s instrumental role in designing Uruguay’s CACs in April 2003, which went well
beyond Mexico’s surgical response to official initiatives.
Uruguay’s documentation, including aggregation and the trust structure, became the model for
Argentina and the Dominican Republic, represented by other lawyers at Cleary Gottlieb, as well
as Iraq, a Buchheit client – all comprehensive debt restructurings. Argentina added a twist by
introducing a trust indenture that covered both New York and English-law bonds. Most recently
Grenada (another Buchheit client) used the trust structure and eliminated a bondholder’s
individual right to sue for missed payments.261 To the extent U.S. pressure for CACs played a
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role in these cases, it certainly did not seek to go beyond the Mexican majority amendment
model.
Uruguay and even more so Grenada were smaller and less sophisticated issuers than Mexico,
Brazil, or Argentina. Our interviews suggest that smaller issuers were more likely to look to
their lawyers for substantive strategic decisions, which in turn may have given more of an
opening to an entrepreneur like Buchheit. His lengthy involvement with CACs and the official
sector may have prompted him to respond to official pressure in ways different from other
lawyers. Taylor’s philosophical discomfort with endorsing specific clauses made minimalism
the natural response for those who worried about government pressure more than they did about
holdouts – it also offered two good reasons for Mexico’s preemption strategy.262 For those like
Buchheit who worried about holdouts, official advocacy offered a window of opportunity to fix
the problem; the others’ minimalist tendencies worked to narrow that window.
In the Buchheit story, a market actor who had identified a market failure did play a key role in
producing a set of clauses which address that failure. It was not the role reported in the
published stories, which focused on Mexico’s CAC move. Instead, Buchheit’s role as market
innovator emerged in the window created by the Mexico shift and occurred in the background,
with a fraction of the fanfare that accompanied the first issue.
v.

Great Men and Little Funds

“Market resistance” is the standard explanation for the eight-year lag between the Rey Report
and February 2003. In contractual boilerplate studies – assuming CACs were optimal for the
parties – it immediately evokes network effects and switching costs.

We used our interviews to

try to unpack the forces behind investor resistance to CACs.
Interviews and official records suggest that large sell-side investment banks often acknowledged
the theoretical value of CACs in principle, but generally rebuffed official requests to intervene
with their sovereign clients. A banker ultimately involved in an early CAC issue put it this way:
262
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“Treasury would call and we would say that we are not an arm of the U.S. Government, we work
for the issuers.” He pointed out that he might have advocated for CACs if he could have assured
an issuer that a new legal term would save it even a fraction of a basis point – but a cost savings
seemed utterly improbable.263 An official outreach log entry for this firm reads “Will not raise
CACs with issuers.”264 Once issuers made up their minds to move, the bankers – much like the
lawyers – were instrumental in designing the early issues and setting the market standard.
In contrast to the Klausner-Kahan study where end investors are characterized as diffuse and
invisible, the buy-side was prominent throughout the CAC episode. But the buy-side came in
several varieties. EMCA got the most attention and stirred up the greatest passions. It was
staffed entirely by investors with busy day jobs. Many of its leaders joined up in reaction to
what they saw as sell-side fecklessness, official venality and issuer treachery in Ecuador and
Argentina. But they also expressed higher motives, such as improving the asset class or bridging
the intractable information gaps that plagued emerging markets sovereign debt:
Market people thought the government people were morons. Government people said,
why are you buying this stuff, you know what it is… Markets see [the IMF] as the
transfer agent for their money to developing countries. Developing countries see it as the
paymaster that makes sure that creditors get paid. Both cannot be right.265
Publicly, EMCA styled itself as the voice of the bondholder grassroots, and had initially
distanced itself from the older, more professionalized trade groups with significant sell-side
membership and roots in the 1980s debt crisis. EMCA’s penchant for public purity positioned it
as the arch-enemy of both SDRM and CACs. But the group was the first on the investor side to
propose a package of clauses that included majority amendment. EMCA’s “Model Covenants
for New Sovereign Debt Issues” circulated informally as early as May 2002, four months before
the G-10 clauses and eight months before the consensus clauses later endorsed by seven market
associations including EMCA itself.266
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Like the official initiatives to promote creditor collective action, EMCA clauses technically
removed the unanimity constraint. In hindsight, market contacts point to these clauses as
evidence that investors had always accepted CACs in principle. But EMCA’s effort addressed
fundamentally different problems – issuer misbehavior and sovereign immunities. One member
said that EMCA clauses came about after investors “saw Argentina acting the way it did” in late
2001-early 2002.267 Drafted by a lawyer who had successfully sued several emerging markets
governments, the clauses proposed to facilitate injunctive relief, waive central bank immunities,
and broadly expand the universe of assets and protections available to creditors. The amendment
threshold was 95% for an expanded list of reserve matters including key financial terms, 75% for
most other terms, and 100% for the amendment provisions themselves.
EMCA said that it took the official sector at its word – if Treasury really wanted a market fix for
financial crises, and granting its decision to go about the fix by altering private contracts – we,
the market, would organize to claim the terms we really want. In effect, these bondholders tried
to use the official initiative, including Taylor’s reluctance to be prescriptive, as a vehicle to
revisit some of the contractual battles that led to EMCA’s birth. Their clause package would
help defeat exit consents and enshrine a broad interpretation of the pari passu clause to facilitate
debt enforcement.268 CAC advocates outside the bondholder community saw a Trojan horse,
and the package went nowhere.
EMCA’s effectiveness and power base were not entirely clear. On the one hand, its board
http://www.emcreditors.com/pdf/model_convenants.pdf.
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members had remarkable access to high level U.S. officials, and its public reactions to events of
concern (such as sovereign defaults and G-7 policy turns) were quick and forceful; on the other
hand, its ability to hold its own base together and speak for the entire emerging markets buy-side
community were patently limited. Mexico’s CAC issue and Argentina’s restructuring both
occasioned indignant EMCA press releases, but drew participants from its membership.269
EMCA’s limited influence on the contractual front had a structural reason. We noted in Section
II that buy-side investors do not normally negotiate sovereign bond contracts; the sell-side does it
for them. Issuer’s and underwriter’s counsel do the drafting. Investors can and do make their
views known to issuers and the sell side – hence the expanded list of reserve matters in Mexico
and the virtual disappearance of aggressive exit consents after Ecuador – but typically, to buy or
not to buy is the only decision the buy side gets to make, sometimes with the help of in-house
lawyers, but often without. Some sovereign debt lawyers told us they simply have no occasion
to interact with the buy-side. EMCA leaders understood this structural predicament and saw the
public campaign for CACs as an opening for more direct input into contract terms. But Taylor’s
refusal to be prescriptive cut both ways – he would not protest Brazil’s 85% threshold, nor would
he carry the water for EMCA on pari passu.
Several of our public and private sector contacts said that by the fall of 2002, some large
emerging markets investors were dissociating themselves from the EMCA leadership position,
which they characterized as too vocal, inflexible, and “legalistic” (they attributed the latter to the
presence of lawyers-turned-fund-managers on EMCA’s board):
We invest based on economic fundamentals. Legal minutia is not what we do. … These
legal provisions – we are money managers – do we read them? … We are supposed to be
smart enough, invest in a liquid market – if there is a debt crisis, you are not supposed to
have the debt! … SDRM was ridiculous. … Everyone agreed that CACs are a decent
step forward. Once they are introduced, we’ll see how the market reacts – if anyone
cares.270
Late in 2002, several executives responsible for large dedicated emerging markets funds
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contacted the official sector and offered help with getting a country to adopt CACs. They
proposed a meeting to reassure high-quality issuers of their willingness to buy CAC bonds; as
noted earlier, the meeting was scheduled but Mexico backed out.
When Mexico launched its first CAC bond, EMCA was furious. The following view, emailed
the day after the deal closed, is indicative:
First, the procedure made the whole deal feel like a jam-job. EMCA had draft covenants
on the table for nearly two years. We were not even consulted before this deal was put
on the table. Kind of pathetic. After years of Buchheit et al complaining that the buyside cannot organize itself, when we finally _do_ organize, the issuers and allied officials
ignore us. This does not engender good will on the part of the market. (That, of course,
is probably not on the officials’ agenda anyway.) … [M]ost dedicated EM investors
believe that the UST and Cleary were behind much of this deal. As a technical matter it
was not so much elegant as clever/sneaky to bring the first CACs … in Mexico.
Crossover investors are a big part of the Mex investor base, so there was no need to force
these bonds onto the dedicated EM investors who are the key buyers of the lower grade
EM credits. … The 75% threshold is a joke. EMCA and EMTA said as much. The
trigger level leaves the clause open to easy abuse by distressed sovereigns. It is unlikely
to be an issue in Mex, since the probability of default is so low for this credit. … The
trigger level is the key to making CACs effective vs a joke. And what happened to all of
the other covenants that the buy-side asked for? The negotiations over bond docs have
been a joke – nothing has started.271
Many contacts told us of a contentious conference call organized by the lead managers, Goldman
Sachs and JP Morgan, shortly after the launch. Most of the sentiment was along the lines of the
preceding quote. One of the larger investors “piped up and lauded the Mexicans on taking an
important step forward and asserted that if people were so skeptical of the issuers’ motives
maybe they should be investing in another asset class … but he was a lone positive voice.”272
One sell-side banker said in retrospect that the conference call represented “95% of the noise
[that]occurred” in response to CACs.273 Many said to us that EMCA activists represented a
small fringe of the investor community. But even if that were true, at the time, the deal
managers could ill afford to dismiss them – “We have five major institutional investors … are
saying ‘if you buy this you destroy the asset class’ … They are thought leaders.”274
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One thought leader who got credit for the CAC shift from the press and government officials was
Pimco’s Mohamed El-Erian. El-Erian was among the largest investors in emerging markets
assets, a former IMF staffer, and one of EMCA’s founding board members (he resigned after
2001).275 He often spoke publicly on policy issues relevant to the asset class, and to many was
taking on the role of a buy-side “senior statesman”. We have heard from multiple sources that he
engaged actively with the official sector in the winter leading up to the CAC shift, and had
offered to work with major issuers to help broker the shift. But just as many contacts said that he
was unhappy at not being consulted ahead of time about Mexico’s issue and did not buy it for
reasons that had to do with some combination of money and principle.276
EMCA was one of three market associations active in the CAC episode in the United States. The
Washington-based Institute of International Finance and New York-based EMTA (formerly the
Emerging Markets Traders Association) both engaged regularly with officials throughout the
private sector involvement campaign of the 1990s, and especially in the CAC-SDRM debate. IIF
was founded early in the 1980s debt crisis, with a membership comprising leading commercial
banks that were also the dominant creditors to troubled sovereigns. In addition to serving as an
industry forum for major financial institutions and a liason with the official sector, IIF
periodically publishes economic and market research. EMTA started in the early 1990s with a
mission to facilitate trading in the Brady Bonds and later all emerging markets debt. Although
its membership and some of its activities are broadly similar to IIF’s, it focuses more on
improving trading practices, market and legal infrastructure, and serves as the authoritative
clearing house for information in these areas; it hosts research conferences but does not produce
independent economic analysis. A former Bush I Treasury official is the head of IIF; EMTA’s
head is a former Shearman & Sterling partner who was active in the Brady restructurings. Both
organizations aspire to represent both sell-side and buy-side investors; they are often seen as
closer to the sell-side, an impression that was reinforced with EMCA’s appearance on the scene.
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IIF leadership was in frequent contact with Taylor and his colleagues from the earliest days of
the CAC initiative. Charles Dallara, the head of IIF, took the lead as a liason between the group
of seven interested industry associations and the U.S. Treasury; much of the focus was on
defeating SDRM. Treasury officials said they valued IIF’s early support for the contractual
approach, but worried that the group did not appear to have a way of operationalizing the support
quickly: “Charles’s initial reaction was positive. But it wasn’t ‘We’re doing it’ – not
operational.”277 Some at IIF saw Treasury’s campaign as much too public and adversarial – the
problem was not CACs themselves, but the public sector cramming them down on the market, in
2002 just as much as in 1996:
[I] believe from the bottom of my heart, if G7, Treasury, IMF – anyone – had serious
discussions about CACs on a voluntary basis, could have had CACs in bonds four years
earlier.278
Treasury’s outreach to individual issuers and institutions, which Taylor considered key to the
ultimate success of the CAC shift, was counterproductive in this view. When approached in his
individual capacity, each market participant was bound to “talk his book” – hence some of the
more vituperative responses to early official overtures. The function of a trade association like
IIF was to act in the collective interest of the market, to bring out the inner statesman in the
financier.279
But in 2002, Treasury was in a hurry. Whether IIF could have delivered CACs in the relevant
time frame is subject to debate. Buy-side and sell-side investors involved in early CAC issues
consistently and colorfully dismiss IIF efforts as irrelevant. Then again, most of the deal
participants were mid-level executives. IIF tended to work through “senior statesmen” at the
higher rungs of major global institutions. Most of them knew one another from having worked
together on the loan restructurings of the 1980s, a time when the informal norms of this small
community of elite bankers, lawyers and government officials ruled the roost. Skeptics
dismissed the “great men” approach as a relic of the 1980s that simply could not deliver in the
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diffuse, diverse world of the capital markets.280 But surely support at the very top could not hurt.
While IIF appeared to lead negotiations with the official sector, EMTA played a central role in
the last key design exercise leading up to Mexico’s issue. Following EMCA’s clause proposal
and the formation of the G-10 working group on clauses, the onus was on the industry
mainstream to produce a set of terms that stood a realistic chance of being adopted. The goal
was partly to pre-empt SDRM, but also to address the one problem around which there was
consensus among market participants – the problem of “the rogue debtor”.281 EMTA, EMCA,
IIF, the London-Based IPMA and three broader securities industry groups released the
“marketable clauses” package on January 31, 2003, together with an early version of the code of
conduct for sovereign restructurings.282 These clauses were a far cry from EMCA’s, but shared
the same essential impetus – creditors were willing to yield on majority amendment for key
financial terms (this time at 85% of the outstanding principal provided 10% did not object), in
exchange for much more robust investor protections, disclosure and safeguards against the use of
exit consents. The process of building consensus among the “Gang of Seven” trade associations
took time; their clauses were the last to arrive on the scene. But their release really did signal a
turning point – by early February 2003, every market constituency as well as the government of
every major financial jurisdiction was on record supporting some form of clauses; the only
question was which form would prevail.
Yet again, industry endorsement of CACs was hardly on the merits, as a robust solution to a real
collective action problem. Years later, one of the leaders of the “marketable” drafting effort
called the entire CAC episode “make-work”. He speculated that successful holdout litigation
against Peru in 1996 had galvanized official efforts to solve a holdout problem that was not
really there:
Suing a sovereign is so damn hard – being a holdout is hard, not smart. … The official
sector was offended by what happened to Peru – someone bought low and shook down
Peru. … It offended their sense of fairness in the financial system. I was pretty offended
while the Brady deal was going on, but not when [the holdout] collected. Peru was flush.
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It paid when it did not have to pay.283
A sell-side banker involved in an early CAC deal said he “suspected that Taylor was smart
enough to realize that whether [issuers] include or exclude CACs meant not a hill of beans –
which turned out to be the case. I thought it was entirely political.”284 And a buy-side money
manager summarized the general sentiment this way:
Conceptually it is hard to argue against CACs if they are written well. [CACs] removed
the very small probability that holdouts would stop a country from conducting a
generalized restructuring. The issue is nonsense, but CACs if properly drawn would [be]
the appropriate theoretical response. If you think that holdouts are a small problem,
[amendment threshold] should be above 90%. If you are of the other view – they should
be as low as possible. This begs the question whether the public sector was concerned
with a smooth and efficient workout, or with their capital being trapped. … [CACs are] a
potentially reasonable theoretical answer to a remote but plausible theoretical problem.
Get into compound complex sentence that the average investor group does not worry
about.285
vi.

The Ultimate Market Story

It is worthwhile at this point to pull together the different interview strands that address Mexico’s
own motives for moving first. SDRM was malingering at the IMF, the U.S. Treasury had
lobbied Mexico for months, and drafting efforts were proliferating. But these factors weighed
against what seemed like unwavering resistance at the highest levels in the Mexican government.
The core Mexican team responsible for making the decision consisted of three officials led by
the Finance Minister. The Minister himself went so far as to write a scathing 13-page letter to
O’Neill in November 2002, expressing his intractable opposition to both CACs and SDRM.286
What changed the minds so drastically that (apparently, on a weekend) Mexican officials called
their lawyers down to Mexico City to implement the change?
We often heard two explanations of this turn around. Market participants, both lawyers and
bankers, told of a rumor that some other country, some small country, was going to launch an
offering using industry-sponsored clauses with high amendment threshold. Such unfavorable
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CACs risked becoming market standard if Mexico did not preempt this unnamed small country.
Others focused on Mexico’s leading role in opposing SDRM. An influential trade press account
of the CAC shift suggested that taking SDRM off the table was the most likely quid pro quo that
Mexico extracted out of the United States.287
Both stories are problematic, even though we heard them from multiple sources. Not one of our
contacts had a clue as to the identity of the country in the small country-bad clauses rumor,
raising the possibility that it was just that – a rumor. In public and in private, Mexican officials
expressed only a general desire to preempt bad precedent, and concern about proliferating public
and private initiatives that threatened to destabilize the boilerplate. Bankers and lawyers
involved in the deal echoed the sentiment.
As for fear of SDRM and the quid-pro-quo theory, it rings only partly true. Based on the
accounts already described, it is unlikely that a U.S. Treasury under John Snow would have
continued the two-track charade much beyond the spring of 2003. Hubbard’s keynote at the IMF
conference on January 22 signaled to a wide spectrum of interested parties that White House
support was not there. On the other hand, even after Mexico’s debut, a market-wide shift looked
far from certain.288 Mexico’s issue was a hopeful sign and a powerful rhetorical weapon for the
contract contingent, but not mission accomplished. And in any event, even wholesale adoption
of CACs was never an adequate substitute for statute in the SDRM camp. Almost two years and
two dozen CAC issues since Mexico, one U.S. contact speculated that if a vote were held on the
day of our interview, a majority of the IMF Board would have supported SDRM.289
So what moved Mexico? Mexican officials tell the ultimate market story – an issuer with
significant market power that perceived a threat to this power from a mix of official meddling
and bondholder activism:
For us, the issue was our role as issuer. We were concerned about the state of discussion
on the markets … What generated the change? We didn’t like the fact of being pushed
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around by international initiative where our fate was not very clear.290
This is not so much a story of Mexico eager to get the best possible clauses into its debt, or
Mexico worried that SDRM would come to pass, but of Mexico worried that talk of SDRM –
and clauses – would not stop. The talk got everyone thinking about default (the morgues),
threatened to create uncertainty in the markets about G-7 and IMF behavior in crisis, and to
increase the cost of capital for the very countries that were supposed to benefit from the
initiatives.
We have no way of knowing whether the story of market and political leadership that we read in
the press and heard from Mexican officials in fact reflects their true motives for using CACs.
Virtually all the lawyers, bankers and investors involved in the first CAC deal, as well as the G-7
officials who lobbied Mexico, all stress the reputational factors and U.S. pressure and deemphasize the CACs’ substantive value. The limited scope of Mexico’s CACs supports the
point. To the extent Mexico wanted to use the CAC incident to create a perception of autonomy
and leadership, it was wildly successful. A European observer put it this way:
Mexico may have been ahead of the curve … They not only earned the respect of the
official sector (that didn’t mean anything to the Mexicans) – they showed the markets
that they were ahead of the markets. … They are too intelligent, too sophisticated to
have believed SDRM was a realistic possibility.291
The market participants and officials we interviewed were uniformly effusive about Mexican
debt managers’ intelligence, sophistication, financial acumen, and investor relations style.
Mexico, they said, was not like any other emerging markets issuer. Observers spoke of a
“revolutionary experience”, a “transformation of mentality between 1994 and 2000”, of getting
“out of the victim mentality” that plagues the emerging markets.292 Mexican officials “may well
have been the only adults in the whole crowd”:
[Mexico’s Deputy Secretary of Finance Agustín] Carstens had been Mexican ED [Board
representative] at IMF. He was always very open minded and into modernizing the IMF
– he was ok on transparency etc, which put him in contrast with many of his EM
colleagues on the Board. In FinMin, he worked a lot with markets. I actually think
Agustin was being internationalist minded at the time and believed that he thought
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Mexico should be internationalist to show that it was playing a greater role as a
responsible player on the global scene. He and Alonso Garcia should be mega-stars of
the article.293
While Mexico’s circumstance and leadership indeed stood out at the time, it seems prudent to
note – as many of our contacts did – that the shift conceived in the turmoil of the 1990s finally
happened under extraordinarily benevolent market conditions, when interest rates in mature
market economies were at all-time lows and investors were flocking to emerging market debt.294
Mexican debt was investment grade, and was generating significant interest from crossover
investors. The government had pre-financed itself for the year, so did not really need the money
(it used the proceeds of the CAC issue to retire more costly Brady Bonds). It was difficult to
envisage a better time.295 Even so, the experiment was not riskless:
At the time, Mexico could issue $1 billion on a day’s notice; everyone knew our
contracts. [Issuing with CACs] disturbed it a little bit without an immediate benefit for
Mexico. … Push [to] strengthen international financial system. … Instead of opening
the book in the morning and closing six hours later oversubscribed, three days working
the phones. Some committed clients surprised, some sensed betrayal – [because Mexico
had] not consulted them.296
Mexican officials involved in the first CAC deal describe the clauses as generally beneficial, but
suggest that the principal public benefit from Mexico’s move was to let business people return to
doing business:
Both debtors and creditors like having a set of contracts, and proceed to issue.
Impractical to make the issue of contracts … [Settling procedural terms] allows to focus
on the substantive issues of the transaction – issues, rights, options – this is what the
market participants want.297
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In this framing, which we heard repeated in conversations with other emerging markets contacts,
government debt managers are first and foremost market participants, whose principal mission is
to minimize borrowing costs. We got the distinct sense that when these officials spoke of a
disequilibrium that prompted the CAC shift, they referred to the flurry of public sector crisis
resolution initiatives. For them, public good and international prestige came by way of being
market actors par excellence.298
vii.

At the Tipping Point

Mexico’s sound economy and sterling reputation made it the perfect first mover in February
2003. These same qualities gave skeptics the perfect excuse to dismiss it as precedent. Mexico
was not like the rest of the emerging markets; maybe its CAC issue should be viewed much as
the G-7 countries’ attempts to “lead by example”, putting clauses in their own foreign-currency
debt – a face-saving but irrelevant gesture.299
The next two countries to launch CAC issues were Brazil and Uruguay, both in April 2003.
Unlike Mexico, neither Brazil nor Uruguay had been doing quite so well. Brazil had been out of
the international markets for over a year. It had only just elected a leftist government under
President Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva, prompting questions in the markets about its economic
policy course. Uruguay had suffered a shock from Argentina’s financial crisis, including a
massive bank run that only stopped with the help of an IMF package that amounted to $500 for
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each Uruguayan.300 The CAC announcement came as part of a comprehensive debt
restructuring, a last-ditch effort to avoid default. If Brazil and Uruguay could use CACs, even
hardened skeptics would have to concede that the shift was on its way.
We heard two kinds of explanations for Brazil’s and Uruguay’s moves. The first attributed the
shift to competition among lawyers and law firms to set the market standard for CAC issues. As
discussed earlier, we found no evidence of such competition. The second explanation brought
back U.S. pressure as the dominant factor. As with Mexico, the pressure was there, but the way
in which it worked, and the extent to which it was effective, were all highly context-specific.
In early 2003, Brazil had more credit outstanding with the IMF than any other country – and was
about to draw more, and extend its repayment period before the year’s end.301 From this
perspective, it could ill-afford a public spat with official creditors. But Brazil also has been for a
long time if not the largest, then among the two-three largest emerging markets issuers in the
world: it accounts for about 21% of the EMBI and 16% of the EMBI Global, with Mexico as its
nearest competitor:302
In the short-term, Brazil faced incredibly hard times in the market. … Everything could
be used against us. We had to preserve relations with bondholders at any cost.303
With Mexico, Brazil led the opposition to SDRM in the IMF Board. Some Brazilian officials
said that initially they did not see much light between CACs and SDRM – both gravely
threatened the country’s fragile market access. But faced with a combination of SDRM’s
resilience and a growing sense of market acceptance for some form of CACs, they came to
describe clauses as a “good compromise”, “reasonable, not disruptive”, and ultimately, a “Pareto
improvement”.304
Two factors affected the timing of Brazil’s first CAC issue. First, unlike Mexico, it needed the
money and so had to launch in favorable market conditions for its own sake, if not for the CAC
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cause. Second, Mexico had to go first. We believe that had Brazil returned to market in January
instead of April, its CACs would have had to wait. Mexico’s first move established the
presumption that CACs carried no penalty; Brazil tested it. Mexican and Brazilian finance
officials knew one another and had discussed CACs and SDRM; however, we have no evidence
that they had specifically coordinated their respective CAC debuts.
Our contacts described Brazil’s first CAC issue as “part of a very clear indication on many fronts
of where we stood.”305 Brazil stood in a delicate spot. With Lula’s election, it desperately
needed to reassure investors of its free-market credentials – “evolutionary, rather than
revolutionary – that was our sound byte”306 – which made any discussion of potential default
anathema. According to trade press, Brazil “absolutely had to have a hugely successful deal to
mark its reintroduction to the capital markets.”307 On the other hand, if Brazil saw itself
ultimately as part of the Mexico cohort, issuing with CACs was not all bad: “We wanted to do
it, it was time to do it.”308 Brazil needed G-7 support to continue drawing exceptional sums from
the IMF at a very delicate time for its economy and political system. In a more subtle sense,
Brazil needed to signal to the markets that the United States and the G-7 will stand by it in the
event things took a turn for the worse.
The resulting compromise, a majority amendment clause with an 85% threshold – in contrast to
Mexico’s 75% -- is easy to explain in this context, even as it drew vigorous criticism from others
in the sovereign debt world.309 Conspiracy theorists blamed Brazil’s lawyers and investment
bankers; in our conversations, Brazilian officials insisted that the decision was their own. Critics
said that the 85% threshold signaled both that Brazil was a weaker credit, and that the threshold
itself made a difference.310 Arguably this was counter to everything that Mexico had tried to
accomplish in designing its first move.
But Mexico’s offer was structured specifically to launch CACs; launching CACs was at best a
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third-tier objective for Brazil. And Brazil was spectacularly successful in meeting its first-tier
objective – the issue was oversubscribed, with an order book total of $7 billion for a $1 billion
offer, spread among 430 accounts.311 Brazil has since shifted its amendment threshold to 75%,
in line with Mexico’s, validating it as the new market standard. In retrospect, its officials
describe the episode as “technical progress”; some go out of their way to praise Taylor’s
reasonableness and sensitivity.312
CACs were not foremost on the minds of Uruguayan officials facing imminent default on a debt
stock of over $5 billion. But in an odd way, legal provisions became deeply entangled with the
business and policy aspects of the debt exchange:
We did not like to default on debt. Did not know about CACs, SDRM. But by chance
immersed into a very sharp debate among lawyers, U.S. Treasury, IMF – something we
realized months later – trying to solve fundamental problems.313
The essential debate in Uruguay’s case had to do with its IMF package and the terms of its debt
restructuring. Uruguayan officials prized the country’s reputation as a reliable borrower – it did
not have its neighbors’ history of defaults. But because much of its debt was held domestically,
they also worried that a default, or deep debt reduction, would spur another bank run.314 But the
official sector was ill-disposed to finance another bailout of private creditors. Some Uruguayans
suspected that theirs was becoming a test case for a new regime that would lead into SDRM.315
More likely IMF was still reeling from Argentina’s default and accusations that the Fund had
financed patently unsustainable policies and last-ditch debt exchanges that increased Argentina’s
already unsustainable debt.316 IMF staff and some market participants grumbled that Uruguay’s
proposed restructuring terms were too rich – a mere extension of maturities – and would leave its
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debt levels dangerously high, guaranteeing another restructuring shortly.317
Against this background, Uruguay was probably the only one of the early movers that had
approached CACs recognizing that they might be used in the foreseeable future – even granting
the team’s deep conviction that its proposed financial path was sustainable. Uruguayan officials
report that they had decided to use CACs in late January, a month before Mexico’s issue. Even
though Cleary Gottlieb represented both Mexico and Uruguay, the bankers and their lawyers
were all different, and we found no evidence that the documentation work on the two issues was
coordinated in any meaningful way. Everyone involved in Uruguay’s issue said that Mexico’s
success made it easier to sell Uruguay’s more radical clause package. But at least one lawyer
speculated that Uruguay would have tried CACs even if Mexico had not gone first, piggybacking
on the G-10 recommendations. A G-7 official was more blunt: “Do you really think that Urugay
would, in coming to us to support big IMF money and an Exchange Stab[ilization] Fund loan,
have not had CACs in their exchange?”318
Uruguay’s deal was intensively marketed for months and made specific accommodations in
response to investor requests, which generated good will. The team did not have to worry about
a CAC price penalty, since in a restructuring the price is set in the offer. Participation was the
only open variable. Uruguay’s exchange closed a month after it was launched, with over 90%
participation; the holdouts were later paid off. So far, Uruguay has not needed to restructure
again.
Uruguay is also the only case we know where the participants produced a pro-forma calculation
after the exchange to see how CACs might have changed the results.319 The exercise suggests
that single-issue CACs of the Mexican and Brazilian variety would have increased participation
by a few percentage points each. The big jump came with aggregation, which added up to ten
percentage points, depending on the single-issue voting threshold. Of course such a calculation
cannot reveal how investor behavior would change, if at all, with the advance knowledge that
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their bonds could be amended.
Countries such as Argentina and the Dominican Republic that have restructured since Uruguay
have all built on its basic model, including aggregation. An Argentine official said that by the
time his government announced its intention to use CACs, it was a non-issue – the clauses had
become market standard. He even recalled proposing to lower the amendment threshold below
75%, but was outvoted.320
Once Mexico, Brazil and Uruguay shifted, the floodgates opened. We spoke with some of the
officials, lawyers and bankers involved with the shifts for nine sovereigns that followed the first
three movers: South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, Italy, Panama, Venezuela, Chile, Belize,
Argentina and Dominican Republic. For none of these countries were we able to discern even a
minimal amount of drama in the shifts to CACs. Our contacts said that there simply was no
story to tell at this stage of the CAC shift. After, Mexico, Brazil and Uruguay, the market
controversy around CACs vanished.
This is not to say that these issuers all would have shifted to CACs simply because Mexico,
Brazil and Uruguay had done so. U.S Treasury officials and staff kept working the phones for
months after Mexico, and CACs remained a talking point at every major official meeting. Some
market contacts even reported that the effort escalated after Mexico. From the public sector, we
did not get a sense of escalation, but certainly of continued pressure and an intense desire to
maintain momentum behind “the market solution”. Two officials reported that later in 2003
South Africa went so far as to issue in London in Euros under New York law as a favor to the
United States – quite a change from earlier the same year when, according to outreach records, it
had declined to join the first movers’ group.321 Treasury advocacy gave the impetus, but the
experiences of Mexico, Brazil, and Uruguay seemed to have given the sovereigns and their
advisers confidence that CACs would not raise borrowing costs.
As in every other case we have described, almost none of the professionals involved in this set of
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CAC issues mentioned the need to solve the holdout problem as the motive for the shift. By all
accounts, the impetus came from the U.S. Treasury, transmitted primarily through governmentto-government channels. Long-term considerations of what contract clauses would facilitate
orderly debt restructuring in default did not seem to merit discussion. This was true both at the
individual lawyer/banker level as well as at the level of their firms. No one suggested to us that
particular private firms had chosen to pursue strategies with respect to pushing the CAC shift.
We remained puzzled at the speed with which the shift had occurred following the move by the
first handful of sovereigns. While resistance to the first few moves had been intense, the matter
became a non issue two months later. When we pressed our contacts, they pointed to market
education. Even if all the official drumbeat and private commentary between 1996 and 2003 was
not enough to overcome the first mover problem,322 once that problem was solved, education
kicked in. From the mid-1990s, the market learned the value of CACs; it was now ready to use
them. In response, we suggested that it was improbable that the most sophisticated players in the
international financial markets needed seven years to learn that unanimity requirements were
prone to a far greater holdout problem than were clauses requiring a majority vote. The next set
of explanations was typically more nuanced and came in two versions: the economist version and
the lawyer version.
The economist version of the story, which we heard from both bankers and officials, boiled
down to one factor – price. Economists in the public and the private sector disagreed vigorously
on the existence of a holdout problem in need of a solution; but they agreed that for the CAC
shift to happen, participants needed a better sense of the cost to sovereigns of switching to CACs
in their New York law bonds. For debt managers and their bankers to be comfortable with a
switch, they needed assurances that the penalty would be minimal. If academic pricing studies
helped frame official advocacy,323 then real investor behavior and market research in Mexico,
Brazil, and Uruguay demonstrated palpably, in the market’s own terms, that price penalty
worries were a red herring – at least when market conditions were sweet.
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For the lawyers, the key issue was not pricing, but the cost of deleting a protection that had been
in New York law sovereign bonds as far back as anyone could remember. Every one of the
clauses in a standard form document is there for some historical reason, a number of the leading
lawyers explained. Some major event temporarily altered the balance between debtor and
creditor or among creditors. New clauses typically arose as responses to such events.324 When
someone proposes to alter a clause, lawyers want to know why it had been included in the first
place – or what protection would be lost by removing it. That loss often cannot be discerned just
by reading the text of the clause.
Quarles apparently sought to address this concern with his intervention at the IMF conference in
January 2003.325 Quarles’ former firm, Davis Polk, had played a leading role in the era of
railroad bankruptcies and equity receiverships (roughly between 1880 and 1930). Collusion
among large creditors and large equity interests in the big workouts of that era threatened to
squeeze out minority creditors. The response culminated in the creation of a corporate
bankruptcy system where workouts would be supervised by a federal judge. So as to protect
minority creditors outside bankruptcy, publicly issued corporate bonds in the United States were
required to mandate unanimous approval for any changes to key payment terms. Quarles knew
this history and was able to explain the origins of unanimity provisions. These clauses, he
explained were a function of the move to statutory corporate bankruptcy. The existence of a
bankruptcy system where holdout problems would be settled meant that outside bankruptcy,
creditors could live with the onerous unanimity requirement. The United Kingdom saw no
similar statutory reform, which is why English law corporate bonds continued to have majority
amendment provisions. By some accounts, Quarles’ speech reassured many U.S. lawyers that
there was no hidden danger in switching to CACs.
Even as he re-endorsed the two-track approach in the same speech, Quarles’ history lesson neatly
reinforced the CACs-SDRM opposition. It implied that CACs made sense only in the absence of
a bankruptcy system; bankruptcy made them inessential. Statutory sovereign bankruptcy was
just what the private sector wanted to avoid.
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The facts in Quarles’ speech were not new to academic researchers; Skeel and Tarullo had both
pointed to the history in their respective analysis of CACs.326 Policy makers and a handful of
sovereign debt lawyers knew it as well, including Buchheit, who had described it in an article
published before Quarles’ speech.327 But other lawyers knew little of the history and were
concerned about altering a clause that had long been part of the standard form. Some of these
lawyers told us that Quarles’ remarks influenced them because they had come from a high level
official and were both credible and widely discussed.
viii.

Late Shifters and Non-Shifters

To our knowledge, only four emerging markets sovereigns issued New York law bonds without
CACs after Mexico’s February 2003 issue. These were Israel, the Philippines, China and
Jamaica. Their stories help illuminate the market shift from a different angle.
Take Israel and the Philippines first. Both adopted CACs with a delay, in 2004. With the
Philippines, the answer was that it was still issuing bonds under its old, pre-Mexico prospectus
that had unanimity provisions. With Israel the answer was even simpler. As one of our contacts
explained it, apparently no one had told Israel early on about the new clauses. It appears that the
U.S. Treasury had not been expending effort to persuade Israel to shift.328 Several of our official
sector contacts and an IMF progress report recalled variously Israeli resistance and a technical
problem involving U.S. guarantees for Israeli debt, which surfaced after the lobbying began. The
problems were soon fixed, and each country included CACs its second post-Mexico offering.
China and Jamaica have done multiple offerings since Mexico, but, as of this writing, neither has
shown any indication of switching to CACs. In neither case did any of our contacts suggest that
the issuers’ resistance was due to a deeply held view about the holdout threat. Instead, the
reasons for not shifting relate in part to the nature of their interactions with the U.S. Government.
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With China, the story is public and intuitive. Thanks to mammoth foreign capital inflows and its
policy of maintaining a low fixed exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar, China’s government
is one of the U.S. Treasury’s biggest creditors. The United States has been lobbying China at the
highest levels on issues ranging from the dollar-yuan exchange rate to North Korean nuclear
ambitions. China has shown no inclination to fold under pressure. On CACs, Treasury
reportedly started late, but lobbied hard, and at high levels. In response, China cited price
penalty fears – even in the aftermath of Mexico and Brazil.329 We do not know whether this was
its true motive or a polite way to demur.
Jamaica is a much smaller economy that needs foreign capital. It issues frequently in the United
States, in Europe, and in the Caribbean, although it is a small part of the asset class (its debt is
not part of the EMBIG). At the time of the initial CAC shift, Jamaica owed more than half its
debt to bilateral and multilateral government donors, even though private bondholders were its
single largest category of creditors.330
An early IMF progress report on CACs attributed Jamaica’s reluctance to use them to the fact
that it issued under pre-Mexico documentation, much like the Philippines.331 Its 2003-2004
issuance schedule supports this explanation – most of the issues are either take-downs under
earlier documentation or targeted at European and Caribbean investors.332 A subsequent IMF
report in 2006 singled out Jamaica as the only country to have issued without CACs since June
2005333 (China rarely taps the market). To the extent Jamaica was lobbied in 2003-2004 and was
not inclined to oblige, it had an easy excuse based on its issuance schedule. But we also have no
evidence that Jamaica was subject to intense pressure from the United States early on, perhaps
because it was not a systemically significant issuer. Jamaica, like China and Israel, was not on
the outreach list in January 2003. One staffer described Treasury engagement with Jamaica at
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that time as “minimal … more like nonexistent on the financial side – they were not on the radar
screen.”334 By June 2005, the CAC shift was seen as a done deal, Taylor had left the Treasury,
and U.S. outreach efforts on behalf of CACs had subsided across the board.
Our market contacts reported that neither China nor Jamaica saw any reason to accommodate
Treasury on the CAC front, unless the United States was willing to make it worth their while to
do so. And for its part, Treasury had no carrots or sticks to apply to recalcitrant sovereigns when
“soft power” proved insufficient.
Again, the holdout problem seems to have played no role in the decision against shifting to
CACs. From this alternative perspective of the non-shifters, the key variable was the role of the
U.S. Government and not the substance of the contract term.
ix.

The Meaning of Argentina

No public or private account of the CAC shift passes without mention of Argentina. One of the
largest emerging markets issuers, Argentina also has the distinction of suffering the largest
sovereign bond default in history in 2001. Until then, picky people liked to point out that almost
none of the big crises of the 1990s had featured foreign sovereign bonds, which had been the
overwhelming focus of reform efforts: Mexico’s and Russia’s were about domestic debt,
Thailand’s, Korea’s and Indonesia’s about bank and corporate debt.335 Ecuador, Pakistan and
Ukraine had foreign bond crises, but were just too small to occasion the cataclysm. Their bond
restructurings went quickly; Ukraine even used the CACs already in its English law bonds – but
Pakistan did not and Ecuador could not, with no apparent difference in outcome among the
three.336 Argentina was just the sort of crisis experts had prophesied – hundreds of thousands of
creditors, 150 different bond issues in six different currencies and eight different jurisdictions. It
took Argentina three years to launch a foreign bond exchange, which has left over $20 billion in
holdouts and has been plagued by dozens of lawsuits.337 The crisis shocked and shamed the
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system and got everyone, notably Paul O’Neill,338 energized to do something about it.
Would Argentina have panned out much differently if all its bonds had CACs? We found no one
who said that it would have. Argentina’s reluctance to initiate a deep debt restructuring before
default had little to do with its debt contracts and everything to do with its domestic politics and
the workings of its currency regime.339 The delay in launching debt restructuring after default
and the hostile tone of the operation, again were a function of politics at the highest levels.
While the restructuring contributed to President Nestor Kirchner’s reputation for delving into
detail, we have no evidence that he knew the intricacies of Argentina’s amendment provisions.
What of the litigation? After all, Argentina’s debt swap was held up for over two months thanks
to a creative holdout lawsuit attempting to attach defaulted bonds tendered by participating
holders. The delay cost everyone money, and cut deeply into some traders’ profits. But it had
precisely the opposite impact on participating holders from what theory had predicted: instead of
demanding their own bonds back and holding out for more, the creditors who had already
tendered wanted the restructuring to go on as soon as possible, even if – especially if – the
litigants got paid in full. One of EMCA’s last public acts was an amicus brief in the holdout
lawsuit, asking the Second Circuit to make sure that Argentina consummated the restructuring
regardless of the holdout settlement.340 In the event, the holdouts lost and Argentina went
forward with one of the most aggressive debt reduction deals in recent memory. Since then, its
economy has grown briskly, its debt is back in the index, and foreign creditors have flocked to
Argentine domestic bonds.
Does this mean that CACs would have made no difference at all? Of course not. Pro-forma
calculations in the aftermath of Uruguay’s exchange suggest that if Argentina had used
aggregated majority amendment provisions, at least the passive holdout number might have been
a fraction of $20 billion. Defaulted debt still outstanding is a huge contingent liability for the
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government that could one day materially constrain its external financial activities. On the other
hand, even if most of the $20 billion in holdouts would have gone away under aggregation, those
determined to litigate would have had little trouble buying up a large enough share of one small
debt instrument at 20 cents on the dollar to force it out of the exchange and leaving them free to
litigate.
In sum, Argentina’s crisis certainly motivated just about everyone in the sovereign debt world to
redouble efforts to improve crisis resolution. But remedies differed depending on the
proponents’ diagnosis of the problem that Argentina revealed. As we saw earlier, the prospect of
another IMF bailout prompted the U.S. Treasury Secretary to commission a fix to overcome
inflexible debt contracts, and the ensuing competition between SDRM and CACs. Default drove
industry groups to put proposals on the table designed to address bad faith on the part of the
sovereign debtor. On the other hand, no one has suggested to us that the prevailing fix – CACs –
would have produced a substantially quicker, smoother restructuring, with less suffering or
smaller losses for anyone involved.
x.

The 1997-2001 Shift in England: Inadvertence or Market Response?

Mexico’s shift in February 2003 is often described as the first instance of a sovereign issuer
under New York law using CACs. But two researchers from the Central Bank of Australia,
Mark Gugiatti and Anthony Richards, discovered that this was not exactly correct. Mexico, as
best we know, was the first of the large sovereign issuers to use CACs in a public offering
registered with the SEC. But between 1997 and 2001, at least five smaller sovereign issuers -Lebanon, Egypt, Qatar, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan – used CACs in New York law bonds issued
privately in the U.K.
What caused this departure from convention that appears to have passed well under everyone’s
radar screen? In their research, Gugiatti and Richards, did not articulate a precise causal story,
but speculated that New York lawyers in London had more or less mechanically copied English
law forms, changing only the governing law clause.
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We spoke to many of the lawyers and bankers involved with these early CAC deals, and first
investigated the inadvertence story. On the part of the lawyers, there was no inadvertence. They
knew exactly what they were doing in using English-style CACs. Indeed, they were specifically
concerned about using CACs in New York law bonds, where unanimity was the standard. JP
Morgan, the bankers in the first of these deals (Kazkhstan in 1997) investigated the question of
whether there would be a pricing penalty, found that there would not be, and the deal went
ahead. The New York-based JP Morgan team that worked on Mexico’s first CAC issue in 2003
appeared to be much like the rest of the world – unaware of the early London issues.
But again, the question remains why move in 1997? At the time, there was no direct official
sector pressure on these sovereigns. The answer was that, at the time, U.S. law firms in the U.K.
were allowed only to practice U.S. law. This was interpreted to mean that the U.S. lawyers in
London could issue legal opinions only on contracts governed by some type of U.S. law. The
smaller sovereigns retained U.S. law firms with London offices to document offerings on the
European market, to customers who were familiar with English-law contracts. The goal was to
follow the U.K. standard for investor comfort. But for these lawyers to do the job, the contracts
had to be governed by U.S. law. After much debate, the decision was made to use English law
forms but New York governing law. As it turned out, the market did not pay the slightest
attention to this change. Kazakhstan started the trend; Bulgaria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Qatar
followed.
Some of the lawyers who worked on these deals tell another story, which was all about
governing law. That story, finally, did have to do with solving the holdout problem. At least
some of the senior lawyers had worked on the Brady restructurings in the 1980s and 1990s and
had witnessed the holdout problem first hand in cases such as Poland, which involved bank
loans. In addition, some of the younger lawyers had worked on the more recent Ukrainian
restructuring, which used English-style CACs to secure high participation. These lawyers had a
strong substantive preference for the English law form.
At bottom, the inadvertent form-copying story does not hold up – the lawyers debated the
amendment provisions and knew full well that they were deviating from convention. That said,
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the portion of the story that attributes CACs to U.K. regulatory requirements for the legal
profession is one of regulatory inadvertence. The U.K. authorities were not trying to promote
CACs, but to protect U.K. law firms from U.S. competition. And then there is the story about
lawyers who had seen how effective English-style CACs could be, and those that had been
through the nightmare of attempting to organize a loan restructuring in the face of holdout
creditors. This last story is a market story; a story about how CACs emerged in response to
participants’ experiences with holdouts.
Richards and Gugiatti found the five pre-Mexico CAC movers in a limited data search. Our
interviews raise the possibility that there may be others. One lawyer told us that Argentina tried
to include English-style majority amendment provisions in its first SEC-registered offering in
1993, based simply on the fact that it had the language in its English-law debt. Lead managers
from Merrill Lynch reportedly refused.341 But there may have been other, lower profile issuers
that simply asked and faced little resistance.
V.

Implications

We started this project to learn the causes of the CAC shift and make sense of the conflicting
theories in the press and academic studies. Spending time with participants in the shift reshaped
our inquiry. Most seemed uninterested in talking about the substance of the clauses, or how their
introduction might change behavior in crisis. We were usually the ones to raise the question of
CACs’ effectiveness; when we did, our interlocutors were uncertain, equivocal or outright
dismissive. For them the CAC shift seemed to be not primarily or even secondarily about
changing the substance of contract rights.
While the interviews did not yield the definitive causation story, our conversations did produce
diverse accounts of the process that produced the contract change. These accounts suggested the
deployment of the contract form for purposes other than those traditionally contemplated by
lawyers or economists (ordering relationships among the parties, protecting against litigation
risk). Instead, an actor’s posture in the CAC debate – advocating, resisting, adopting – sent a
341
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message to other actors in international finance about future behavior in crisis, relations with the
official sector, and one’s stature in the market.342 This was case of contract as symbol or signal.
The form and content of these messages in turn echo particular models of international economic
governance.343
Below we elaborate the implications of our study for contract change and the uses of contract.
i.

Who Moved the Boilerplate?

Sovereign issuers, buy-side investors, investment bankers and lawyers all vigorously resisted a
move from unanimity to majority amendment. Proving that this resistance was due to network
effects or other forms of “stickiness” requires establishing that CACs were optimal (if they were
not, market resistance would be rational on the merits). We present no evidence one way or
another on the last point. However, our contacts consistently explained their resistance in terms
that clearly evoked the “stickiness” literature, notably network and learning effects. The
difference between lawyers and others is instructive.
Investors usually said that departure from standard form signaled a country’s increased
willingness to default and maybe also a reduced likelihood of a public bailout. Investment
bankers echoed investors, and issuers pointed to investment bankers as the reason for resisting
change. These explanations echo Ben-Shahar’s and Pottow’s notion of “deviance” 344 – the
importance of the fact that everyone in the New York market at the time was using the same
form; departure from general usage was per se significant, a potentially negative signal that
something different, hence problematic, and hence costly was going on. The fact that the same
investors were holding billions of dollars in English-law debt riddled with much less favorable
majority amendment provisions than those being proposed in New York was irrelevant –
unanimity was not market convention in London; so CAC use there produced no negative
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signals.345 The fact that majority amendment in a single bond would have little effect was a
second-order network-style explanation we heard. In this view, clauses are useless unless they
are everywhere. (Hence the IMF’s periodic progress reports on the proportion of sovereign
bonds with CACs.) This argument was a weaker one for CAC opponents because it did not paint
the clauses as harmful, merely not worth the trouble. As we suggest later, trouble in this case
proved to be a manipulable variable.
Lawyers’ grounds for resistance emphasized learning effects. The fact that unanimity had been
passed down through history was key. Few knew exactly why unanimity had been adopted in
the sovereign context. It may simply have been copied from the standard corporate forms, but no
one we spoke to knew for sure. The uncertainty about precisely what value the clause brought or
what contingency it had meant to address made lawyers reluctant to change it. Plus the entire
contract document was wired to reflect unanimity;346 leaping into the unknown by altering a
single clause held untold risks. Some lawyers cited their improved understanding of the terms’
roots in U.S. corporate bankruptcy history as a reason for eventually dropping their opposition.
But others said they knew all along that unanimity was optional, were familiar with how Englishlaw contracts worked, and either saw no compelling reason to propose the change to their clients
or, as in the case of Argentina in 1993, tried but failed to persuade the investment bankers to
switch.
If these explanations reflect real switching costs, how did the parties overcome them? The
popular answer is government pressure. But this answer is near-useless. It fails to explain why
U.S. and G-7 pressure did not work in the late 1990s, what pressure tactics worked in 2003, and
why. We got the sense that by February 2003, Mexico and other issuers began to see the costs of
resistance exceeding the benefits. Resistance was fodder for reform initiatives, including SDRM
and the various clause packages, which created what Mexico’s debt managers characterized as a
threatening disequilibrium. Emerging markets officials described themselves in this setting as
first and foremost market participants whose goal was to design and execute a least-cost
borrowing strategy. G-7 initiatives raised all kinds of questions about subjects they simply did
345
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not want to discuss with their creditors, including the possibility of default, the likelihood of
official support in default, and the terms on which this support might come. The debt managers
described this public intrusion as a loss of control.347 Adopting CACs offered a way to regain
control and get back to business – a market-based solution to government meddling, not to the
collective action problem touted in the public sector and the academia.
This scenario, which focuses on Mexico’s experience, presupposes several ingredients beyond
periodic nagging from Treasury officials. To the extent the CAC episode holds policy lessons (a
point of keen interest for our public sector contacts), these extra ingredients were key. First,
borrowers and lenders had to agree that some minimal version of CACs was at least harmless.
We heard some reports of learning through different channels, including official outreach,
drafting groups and pricing studies, though none of them had a direct impact and many were
even described as counterproductive. But by 2003, the idea of majority amendment – the
simplest of the CACs – was widely understood even among investors who had never read a
contract, and public debate had shifted to the voting thresholds. Second, for the disequilibrium
to yield the right result, the threat of proliferating initiatives had to be real, and the CAC solution
had to promise to end it. Here SDRM is significant not for its ultimate likelihood of success, but
for its bizarre appearance, surprising persistence, and capacity to catalyze competing initiatives
that presented new threats. The U.S. Treasury’s credibility in signaling that CACs really would
“stop the madness” was important; such a signal may not have been possible before O’Neill’s
departure. Finally, favorable market conditions created a window where investors would assess
an emerging markets credit based on factors other than the imminence of default.
Uruguay’s experience only partly challenges this explanation. Several lawyers, investors and
officials have said that it might have shifted even without Mexico. On the one hand, Uruguay’s
desperate circumstances increased the official sector’s leverage across the board, CACs included.
But unlike the Mexico team, participants in Uruguay’s restructuring were acutely aware of the
possibility of default and repeated restructuring; holdouts were not an abstraction here.
Uruguay’s far-reaching CAC package shows signs of having been designed to address a real
347
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prospect of restructuring. Other issuers went out of their way to put distance between their
inclusion of CACs and the possibility of financial distress. Ironically, the fact that Uruguay
introduced CACs in a distressed exchange, not a fresh issuance, may have made it easier to
innovate. Price was not a variable. Investors faced the choice between imminent default and
what was by all accounts a financially generous deal. Some investors read the generosity and
Uruguay’s extensive marketing efforts as a sign of good faith, possibly offsetting any harmful
signal from including CACs. Most likely neither side had much choice, but at least they made
the best of it and felt better about it.
The fact that Mexico went first made the sales job easier. Uruguay was part of what several of
our contacts described as a “window of innovation” (similar to what Suchman calls a “period of
ferment”348), where market participants and their lawyers consciously experimented with CAC
forms. The window also gave lawyers a more prominent role.
This is significant because we found little evidence that lawyers or investment bankers – largevolume intermediaries at the center of Klausner’s and Kahan’s story – had driven the CAC shift
in the first instance. The most radical innovation took place – and is probably still taking place –
with small countries, not the big high-profile ones like Mexico. Suchman’s description of
lawyers as “pollinators” of organizational form in Silicon Valley supports this view.349 In
Suchman’s study, small technology firms turn to lawyers for general business advice, not just
technical legal support. Large emerging markets sovereigns like Mexico in 2003 needed targeted
legal help. Government debt management had become a highly professionalized internal
function, investor relations programs kept officials in regular contact with their investor base,
and intermediaries were increasingly relegated to circumscribed tactical and technical roles.
Sovereign clients defined the problem – as collective action or official interference – and
commissioned a fix. In contrast, smaller, newer or poorer issuers like Uruguay, Grenada, and
Iraq relied on their lawyers and bankers for a broader range of business decisions, including
framing the problem. If Uruguay had gone first, our story might have turned out differently. But
the market shift might have gone differently as well – or might not have happened at all.
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By mid-2003, the fuzzy learning story of 1996-2003 becomes stark. Investors appear to
conclude within months that CACs carry no price penalty, and after Brazil’s brief dally with
85%, stop paying attention to any relationship between credit quality and the voting threshold.
Lawyers set aside historical concerns and embrace the new model. What some had first
described as an investment grade experiment irrelevant to the asset class becomes emerging
markets standard. Once market acceptance is decreed, contracts are put aside. Issuers and
investors focus on financial terms, and show no signs of rewarding or penalizing further
innovations on the CAC form – at least until the next crisis.
ii.

Public Symbol in Private Contract

The biggest puzzle of our case is just how few participants embraced CACs with the aim of
ordering debtor-creditor relations according to their terms. Issuers said they used CACs to stop
G-7 initiatives, preempt creditor-driven innovation, and assert market leadership. Some on the
creditor side said they saw potential benefit in accommodating the U.S. Treasury to ensure
continued G-7 support for the emerging markets, even as the Bush Administration and its
European allies touted the shift as a signal that public bailouts were no more. What is the
significance of using contract in this way?
In 1941, Lon Fuller described what he called a “channeling function” of the contract form.350
Contracting parties put their agreement in a particular legal form not only to serve as evidence in
court or to constrain one another’s commercial behavior, but also to signal something about their
relationship to the outside world. More recently, Suchman described the notion of “contract as
artifact”, where contractual devices serve not only as a technical fix but also as a symbol and
gesture directed at non-parties.351 In the CAC shift, the function of signaling to third parties
appears to have been critical, even in Uruguay, where everyone was cognizant of the prospect of
restructuring using the new clauses.
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Two aspects of the contract’s public signaling function stand out in our study, and go beyond
Fuller’s and Suchman’s respective constructs. First, the same form in the same context can
transmit different signals in the hands of different participants. Mexico signaled market and,
related, political leadership; investors signaled a cooperative relationship with the official sector
(perhaps hoping for a payoff down the line), while the United States and its G-7 allies signaled a
new approach to crisis management. By using CACs with a slightly higher amendment
threshold, Brazil signaled both its good relations with the official sector and a willingness to
accommodate creditors at a time when it worried about market access. By moving a Eurodenominated issuance from London to New York and using CACs, South Africa signaled
cooperation with the United States.
Second, our case study reveals that contracting parties are not the only ones using the contract
form as a public signal. The Bush Treasury and its counterparts in Europe embraced advocacy
of specific provisions (majority amendment) to signal reduced willingness to back exceptional
IMF packages.352 Note, however, that none of our issuer, investor or lawyer contacts found the
official sector’s gesture credible – the intended audience for the signal refused to link CACs and
IMF packages even where some believed independently that the Bush Administration was less
prone to bailouts. Their skepticism went back to their dim view of the relative importance of
CACs in a financial crisis – “a footnote to a footnote to a footnote”, in the words of one
participant.353 On the other hand, “footnote advocacy” helped frame a concrete policy objective,
an action sequence that engaged all relevant public and private sector players, and a visible
achievement in the name of the new crisis management regime. It is plausible that CACs were
not adopted in the 1990s partly because the initiative had nowhere near the symbolic significance
for the Clinton Treasury that it acquired for its successors, and was associated with bail-in
rhetoric, which the market read as a hostile signal.
In contrast, there is no question that embracing CACs worked for Mexico. It had the effect of
signaling both Mexico’s leading position among emerging markets issuers and set it apart from
shakier credits in the asset class, while also highlighting its special relationship with the United
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States. In a sense, for Mexico, this was partially about status. Different actors suggested that
Mexico was willing to incur the costs and risks of moving first, partially because it wanted to
squash the SDRM and other policy intiatives, but also because risking a cost that others were
reluctant to bear demonstrated its higher status as a creditworthy issuer and a political
heavyweight.354 The fact that the innovation was minimalist and symbolic, rather than a
comprehensive overhaul with a view to restructuring, worked in Mexico’s favor – it reaffirmed
the prevailing impression that Mexico was not contemplating default, thereby reinforcing the
status message.
Analyzing the CAC incident from the “artifactualist” perspective also helps relate this shift in the
sovereign debt contracting regime to the literature on diffusion in sociology, law, and political
science.355 The CAC shift shows many ingredients of a standard diffusion story: an idea that, at
least with respect to majority amendment, is simple and appealing to many different
constituencies (economists, lawyers, policy-makers) and a confluence of bureaucratic structures
and processes uniquely poised for transmission (links among financial policy makers, political
transition in the United States, a history of U.S.-European conflicts on crisis management in the
1990s), which in turn created space for entrepreneurs such as O’Neill, Krueger, Taylor and
Buchheit. The only problem with characterizing the CAC shift as a diffusion story is that it
appears to be above all a diffusion of form, whose normative content is strictly contextual and
shifting, as described earlier, and whose technical efficacy remains to be seen.
iii. Market Myths, Clauses as Governance and the Political Economy of Contract Change
The two preceding sub-sections treat sovereign debt contracts as just another set of contracts
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among private parties. But they are much more than that. One half of each contract is a
government, as are many of the interested third parties; the people involved are often powerful
political actors. The blanket of sovereign immunities that makes traditional contract
enforcement difficult356 partly explains the salience of the symbolic and signaling functions
discussed earlier. The process by which these symbols and signals are generated is by definition
a political process, just as their content is by definition politically significant.357
Our interlocutors had a sophisticated apprehension of the CAC project.358 In one instance, an
investment banker who managed an early CAC issue described the function of the G-10 working
group as creating “an epistemic community” around contract reform.359 The political science
literature on epistemic communities describes a mode of international governance where policy
experts linked in transnational networks disseminate norms and values, which in turn help
entrench them in national power structures and perpetuate institutional arrangements that
reinforce these values.360 Accepting our banker’s characterization, what norms and values were
being disseminated, and how did the somewhat disjointed process we describe help frame these
values?361
Market talk pervaded the CAC episode. CACs were summoned to solve a market failure in
contracting behavior, one that was apparently revealed by the Mexican crisis in 1994 and the
crises in East Asia and Russia.362 In 2003, after more crises including Argentina’s mega default
in 2001, the market finally solved the problem by adopting CACs. Bush and Clinton
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Administration officials describe this logic in very similar terms.363 Our study paints a different
picture. None of the crises usually cited as the inspiration for CACs demonstrate a “market
failure” of the sort that could have been solved by CACs. Few involved meaningful amounts of
sovereign debt governed by New York law; those that did caused no special problems.364 We are
far from the first to make this point, but the large and growing CAC literature appears to elide its
implications. Some of our contacts seemed uncomfortable with the dearth of predicted market
failures to date; others seemed sure their day would come; no one knew or cared about
amendment terms in tesobonos.
Our interviews highlighted the disconnect between the stylized history underpinning CACs and
SDRM alike – large, statesmanlike, cooperative banks of the 1980s replaced by small, dispersed,
obstreperous bondholders of the 1990s – and the vivid accounts we heard of small banks holding
large loan restructurings hostage starting in the late 1980s, demanding payoffs and delaying
economic recovery in the debtor countries. In contrast, the bondholder threat described in
virtually every speech and article on sovereign debt from the mid-1990s appeared in theoretical,
perennially prospective terms. Even Argentina has yet to change this pattern. The reasons for it
are a matter for economic research beyond the scope of our project. Virtually all our contracts –
CAC friends and foes alike – said that the next crisis would surely show if bonds are the problem
they are meant to be, if CACs are useful and if the world needs an SDRM.
More broadly, no one we spoke to suggested that the invisible hand of the market could have
produced the market-wide CAC shift without the heavy hand of the official sector (the
experience of early, spontaneous and obscure CAC adopters such as Kazakhstan is instructive
here). Yet market rhetoric framed the initiative. It was almost as if CACs came to represent “all
things market” in public discourse on sovereign debt.
For the Bush Treasury, embracing contract as a flagship initiative signaled an ideological shift
from Clinton-era “burden-sharing” within a publicly ordered crisis resolution regime, to
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privatized crisis management and a smaller role for international institutions like the IMF.365 At
the most basic symbolic level, “contract” was “market”, literally opposed to “statute”, or SDRM.
The stark contrast was useful even though in substance, the IMF’s fix was quite close to CACs,
and was barely more than a modest bondholder-led coordination initiative. When we pointed out
the oddity of free-market champions engaging in tactics specifically rejected by their
interventionist predecessors, such as commissioning draft clauses or directly lobbying individual
market participants, we got a two-part answer: first, outreach was strictly limited to information
and persuasion (no “hard power”), and second, it was all for the sake of getting the official sector
out of crisis management. Against this background, O’Neill’s iconoclasm in embracing both
SDRM and CACs made no sense symbolically, ideologically or bureaucratically.
Even though Bush Treasury officials and their European allies both condemned Clinton-era
bailouts, European (and for that matter, the Clinton Treasury’s) support for CACs had none of
the ideological resonance of the Bush Treasury advocacy. G-10 officials outside the United
States generally avoided painting CACs and SDRM as polar opposites, nor were they seeking a
reduced role for the IMF – if anything, they seemed to relish the public sector’s new involvement
in contract substance. In this view, both CACs and SDRM were means to institute a rule-based
crisis resolution system and end subsidies, while maintaining public ordering. But CACs worked
best at the highest level of abstraction, signaling a philosophical shift – “contract as market”.
Using other people’s contracts as a commitment device to foreclose bailouts required generalized
belief in CACs’ technical efficacy and significance, which is yet to materialize.
Even though emerging markets officials had initially fought CACs along with SDRM, the way in
which they fought and ultimately embraced the clauses resonates with the privatization story – to
a point. Officials presented themselves in the first instance as market actors, and the interests of
their countries as, above all, the interests of successful market borrowers. Their substantive
position came across as the opposite of Europe’s: stop G-7 meddling in the markets (and our
economic policies), but do not stop large rescue packages. Here contract – freedom of contract –
meant national autonomy, even as it did not foreclose public sector support for the market.
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In 2003, CACs somehow came to channel all these norms, varying the emphasis for different
constituencies. The clauses’ success seemed to lie in their ability to bring together the different
elements of the sovereign debt community in what many participants described as a rare
constitutive moment. Everyone coalesced around a process-based mode of cooperation,
collapsing the public/private distinctions, with contract as the preferred governance tool.366
VI.

Epilogue and Conclusions

In November 2004, the IIF unveiled “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt
Restructuring in Emerging Markets”, a document endorsed by major emerging markets issuers
including Mexico and Brazil, large financial institutions, and two out of the seven trade
associations that had come together in the CAC shift.367 The G-20, a group of major industrial
and emerging markets governments, welcomed the document but deliberately stopped short of
endorsement.368 EMTA distanced itself from the effort, partly because the Principles failed to
take a strong enough stand on exit consents or engagement.
In January 2005, the Bank of England hosted a workshop on sovereign debt contracts. The usual
suspects were in attendance – emerging markets officials, legal experts, underwriters and
investors. The goal was to keep up momentum from the 2003 shift – perhaps prod on further
innovation like engagement clauses, trustees, and aggregation.369 Several participants came
away convinced that further change was not about to happen.
In March 2005, Argentina announced the closing of its bond exchange, which brought in over
$60 billion in defaulted debt – a 76% participation rate. Holders of over nearly $20 billion in old
bonds refused the offer. The deal did not close until June. Dozens of lawsuits are still
percolating through the U.S., European and Argentine legal systems. So far, no holdouts have
been paid. Argentina is growing briskly. Since its intervention in the lawsuit that held up the
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closing, EMCA has posted no new initiatives on its website.
In April 2005, John Taylor resigned from the U.S. Treasury and returned to teaching economics
at Stanford. His successor publicly credited Taylor with ushering in the CAC shift, and
proceeded to focus on global imbalances and China’s exchange rate regime.370
The public window for contract reform had closed. To be sure, lawyers were still tinkering with
the clauses in the privacy of their conference rooms, EMTA kept posting document highlights on
its website, and trade press flagged the occasional novelty,371 but neither the Wall Street Journal
nor the Financial Times took interest. What happened?
As best we can tell, in the mid-1990s, a set of simple contract provisions emerged
simultaneously in legal, policy and academic circles that were inspired in part by holdout
problems in some bank loan restructurings of the late 1980s and early 1990s. These provisions
promised a clear and achievable policy response to new crises that threatened to bring down the
entire international financial system. No one thought that they were a silver bullet, but with
limited options on the table, they could be a tangible step forward, and certainly did no harm.
What had initially looked like low-hanging fruit quickly turned into a formidable challenge due
perhaps to market perceptions of switching costs, but also to disagreements about the likely
effect of the clauses on the balance of power between debtors and creditors. The effect was only
partly mechanical (a change in voting procedures); it was in large part symbolic (associated with
more defaults and less official finance). Early proponents of the clauses in the official sector
chose not to spend political capital to overcome these costs. A few years later, the same clauses
acquired fresh political significance as a signal of new free-market policies in the United States
and a reasonable alternative to a more radical public ordering regime. Even though the radical
threat ultimately proved to be a red herring both in its content and its prospects, it succeeded in
catalyzing the contract initiative and a process around it that ultimately brought together the
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entire world of emerging markets sovereign debt. CACs proved to be an open and flexible
signaling device that, for a brief period, served multiple political purposes in the hands of diverse
players. The CAC shift now seemed eminently worth the cost.
Some creditors tried and, by and large, failed to use the policy opening to rewrite standard form
contracts to discipline sovereign debtors. A few market participants tried and, by and large,
succeeded at introducing a comprehensive package of clauses in New York-law bonds to reduce
the leverage of bondholder minorities. No one knows for sure how these clauses will work in the
next crisis, and certainly not how investors might respond. Just about everyone we interviewed
acknowledged that CACs might help on the margins – but will not change the policy response or
the economic outcome. Perhaps the next crisis will have nothing to do with New York-law
bonds. Do Ghanaian-law bonds have CACs?372
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